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EVALUATING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGE
AWARDS TO PROMOTE SETTLEMENT OF




Although the number of civil cases filed in our nation's
federal courts rose sharply in the past decade,1 the escalation
of employment discrimination litigation has been particularly
astounding.2 The Second Circuit, which at last glance main-
tained the fifth largest docket of all the circuits,3 has also ex-
perienced a surge in employment litigation.4 As we enter a
* 01999 Michelle Cucuzza. All Rights Reserved.
t Ms. Cucuzza is a litigation associate with Robinson Silverman Pearce
Aronsohn & Berman LLP, in Manhattan. After graduating from Brooklyn Law
School in 1996, she served a two-year term as the Law Clerk to the Hon. Arlene
R. Lindsay, United States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York. Special
thanks to Robinson Silverman for all its support and encouragement, to Beth A.
Tchiliguarian for her research assistance and to S.F. for his inspiration.
' For example, in 1993, the number of civil cases filed in federal district court
was 229,850. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts 1997 (visited Oct.
28, 1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/judicial_business/contents.html>, at tbl. C-2A
[hereinafter Judicial Business]. By 1997, that number had increased to 272,027.
See id.
2 In 1994, there were 15,965 employment civil rights cases commenced in the
nation's federal district courts. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts
1998 (visited Oct. 28, 1999) <http'//www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt98/7, at tbl. C-2A [here-
inafter Judicial Business /]. This number has increased steadily each year. The
number of employment cases rose to 19,059 in 1995, to 23,152 cases in 1996, and
to 23,735 cases by September 30, 1998. See id.
' As of September 30, 1999, there were 30,133 cases pending in the Second
Circuit, which ranked behind only the Eleventh Circuit (47,295 cases), the Ninth
Circuit (35,532 cases), the Fifth Circuit (35,216 cases), and the Sixth Circuit
(34,815 cases). See id. at tbl. C-1. Specifically, the Southern District of New York
had the most substantial docket with 11,676 cases, followed by the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York (8,982 cases), the District of Connecticut (3,939 cases), the
Northern District of New York (3,077 cases), the Western District of New York
(2,073 cases) and finally, the District of Vermont (386 cases). See id.
4 Statistics reflecting the exact number of discrimination lawsuits filed in the
Second Circuit during each year in the last decade are not available. Telephone
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new millennium, the explosion of employment discrimination
litigation that has gripped our federal courts in the last few
years shows no signs of subsiding.
Employment discrimination lawsuits are often predicated
on one or more federal statutes, including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"),6 §§ 1981 and 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code,7  and the American with Disabilities Act
("ADA").' Plaintiffs filing suit in New York district courts of-
ten supplement their federal claims with claims brought under
New York's anti-discrimination statute, the New York Human
Rights Law.9 Because each of these statutes is specific with
respect to the conduct it proscribes and the remedies afforded
to aggrieved employees, ° employment discrimination law is a
complex legal maze. Among the various remedies available to
discrimination plaintiffs," compensation for emotional harm
Interview with John Coffey, Deputy Circuit Executive, Office of the Executive for
the Second Circuit (Jan. 28, 2000). While the number of civil rights cases filed in
this circuit are available, statistics on employment discrimination can only be
determined by performing the incredible task of analyzing every civil rights case
docket sheet in this circuit. Id.
By way of analogy, however, a review of employment discrimination decisions
reported and published on-line in Westlaw's Second Circuit database (CTA2-All)
and the New York state and federal court database (NY-CS-All) for the period
January 1, 1990, through December 10, 1999, supports the notion that employment
discrimination litigation has increased in the Second Circuit in recent years. For
instance, the query "employment w/5 discrim!" in the NY-CS-ALL database be-
tween the dates January 1, 1990 and December 10, 1999, revealed 3,741 reported
employment discrimination decisions. Of these decisions, there were 198 reported
decisions in 1990, 225 decisions reported in 1993, 472 decisions reported in 1996,
521 decisions reported in 1998, and between January 1, 1998 and December 10,
1999, there were 1,063 reported decisions. Similarly, the same query in the CTA2-
ALL database revealed 489 employment litigation decisions published on-line for
the period January 1, 1990, through December 10, 1999, and of these decisions,
there were 23 reported cases in 1990, 31 reported cases in 1991, 71 reported cases
in 1997, 87 reported cases in 1998, and 92 reported cases in 1999.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-2000e-2(d) (1964), as amended by Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074-76.
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1994).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-11217 (1995).
9 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993).
" See infra Part I.
n The remedies generally available under the discrimination statutes include
awards for back pay (consisting of the salary and benefits that would have been
realized but for the discrimination); reinstatement and/or front pay; and compensa-
tory damages for out-of pocket expenses, emotional harm and mental anguish
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and mental anguish ("emotional distress") is unique compared
to other monetary remedies in that it is inherently difficult to
quantify. 2 The lack of any mathematical formula with which
to evaluate emotional distress claims understandably impedes
meaningful settlement negotiations between parties, especially
when plaintiffs' attorneys are aware that in the Second Circuit
the slightest evidence of mental or emotional harm is sufficient
to support a verdict and an award for emotional distress."
These factors, together with recent publicity surrounding dis-
crimination suits filed against prominent corporations with
deep pockets 4  and reports of multi-million dollar jury
awards, 5 provide plaintiffs with little incentive to settle their
("emotional distress"), loss of reputation and loss of enjoyment of life. See generally
KENNETH W. TABER, EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION IN NEW YORK 547-62, 566-82 (West
Pub. Co. 1996 & Supp. 1998).
12 See New York City Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d
207, 215, 573 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 (1991) ("Throughout tort low, psychic injury-by
nature essentially subjective-has prompted difficult questions of proof, both as to
establishing the genuineness of any injury and as to fixing its dollars-and-cents
valuation.").
,3 See infra Part II.C.
1' See, e.g., 14 Minority Officers Sue Police Force, Alleging Bias in Disciplinary
Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1999, at B3 (reporting on a group of police officers
that sued the New York Police Department charging race discrimination and seek-
ing damages); Judge Approves Settlement for Black Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1999, at A29 (settlement that could total $2 billion for thousands of black farmers
to redress years of discrimination, estimating $50,000 per farmer); Suit Settled for
$1.7 Million, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Oct. 15, 1999, at B1 (plaintiff fired because of
depression suffered after his wife was diagnosed with cancer settled discrimination
suit under Family Leave Act for $1.7 million; jury had awarded $1.1 million in
compensatory damages); U.S. and Ford Settle Harassment Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.,
8, 1999, at A14 (reporting that Ford agreed to pay nearly $8 million in damages
to women complaining of racial and sexual harassment at two factories); Venator
Group's Ex-Workers File EEOC Suit, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1999, at B-8 (EEOC
sought millions of dollars in suit against Woolworth for laying off hundreds of
employees based on their age).
"5 See, e.g., Anchorwoman Wins $8.3 Million Over Sex Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1999, at B1 (reporting jury award of $8.3 million dollars for gender discrimina-
tion, nearly double of what plaintiff requested, and stating that the "verdict sent
jolt through industry"); Fired TV Anchor Awarded $7.3 Million from Station, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at E5 (reporting $4.8 million compensatory damage award
and $2.5 million punitive damage award to women who were demoted and forced
to take leave due to a disability and who were retaliated against for complaining
of discrimination towards other employees); Jury Awards $12.7 million to a Wom-
an Denied Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1999, at B2 (jury awarded former assis-
tant professor at Trinity College $12.7 million for sex discrimination, $4 million in
emotional distress damages); Male Guard Wins His Sex Harassment Suit, CHI.
TRIB, May 30, 1999, at M5 (reporting jury award of $3.75 million to male state
1999]
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lawsuits and even less incentive to estimate or negotiate the
value of damages for their emotional distress.
Plaintiffs hoping to obtain a substantial award for their
emotional distress may, however, be unaware of a common
pitfall. Even if a plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a large verdict
in federal court, a defendant may make a post-trial motion for
either a new trial on damages, or for "remittitur" (or reduction)
of the jury's damage award, or both, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59.16 While attorneys who practice employ-
ment litigation may be aware of the availability of this post-
trial motion, defense attorneys may not appreciate how easy it
is in the Second Circuit for an employment discrimination
plaintiff to survive summary judgment and reach the jury on
an emotional distress claim or that even the most minimal
evidence of harm may be sufficient to succeed on such a claim.
Furthermore, and more importantly, both plaintiffs and defen-
dants are unlikely to appreciate how emotional distress dam-
age awards actually fare at the end of litigation when attacked
as excessive by a post-trial motion for remittitur. Attorneys
representing clients in the early stages of discrimination law-
suits or consumed in trial preparation have little time or incen-
tive to scrutinize this discrete area of the law.
A review of recent decisions by federal courts in the Sec-
ond Circuit reveals that the courts' resolution of post-trial
remittitur motions can be used by counsel and by courts to pro-
mote settlement. When employers argue that an emotional
distress award is excessive and warrants a new trial, the dis-
trict court must determine first what amount of damages is
appropriate for a particular distress claim. 7 In order to do so,
courts look for guidance to remitted damage awards rendered
by other courts in similar cases. 8 As a result, a "continuum"
or "spectrum" of emotional distress claims and corresponding
damage awards has emerged in employment discrimination
prison guard for supervisors' failure to protect him from sex harassment by female
guard whose advances he rejected).
" Litigants seeking to challenge damages awarded for discrimination claims
brought under the Human Rights Law as excessive must do so under section
5501(c) of New York's Civil Practice Law & Rules. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c)
(McKinney 1995).
17 See infra notes 180-192.
1 See infra notes 193-196.
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cases in the Second Circuit. This continuum, which ranges
from "garden-variety" emotional distress claims on one end of
the spectrum to "egregious" claims on the other, has been ac-
knowledged by the district courts within the Second Circuit19
and is applied routinely to evaluate the worth of a plaintiff's
emotional distress."
The purpose of this Article is to facilitate settlement of
discrimination claims or cases in which emotional distress is
the plaintiff's sole claimed injury or in which litigants have
reached an impasse because "unpredictable" emotional distress
damages have become a sticking point in settlement negotia-
tions.21 This goal can be achieved by educating counsel and
their clients about the ease with which emotional distress
claims may be presented at trial, the slim evidence which may
support a finding of emotional distress, and how emotional
distress claims are evaluated by courts during post-trial pro-
ceedings. If litigants appreciate the likelihood that a discrimi-
nation plaintiff will reach the jury with his or her distress
claim, the likelihood that the verdict will not be reversed or
vacated by the court, and the range of damages to which a
particular emotional distress award will likely be reduced by
the court post-trial if the defendant makes a Rule 59 remittitur
motion, litigants may be, and should be, more inclined to esti-
mate and settle such claims prior to trial, since the amount of
damages to be recovered has become somewhat predictable.2
"9 See, Ortiz-Del Valle v. NBA, 42 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Bick
v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 109283, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
21, 1998); Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014, 1027-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 205 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (canvassing
comparable cases and distinguishing cases upholding higher awards); Hollis v. City
of Buffalo, 28 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing range of ver-
dicts); Trivedi v. Cooper, No. 95 Civ. 2075, 1996 WL 724743, at *6-*9 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 1996) (applying spectrum of cases).
20 See infra Part III.
" See, e.g., Town of Hempstead v. State Div. of Human Rights, 233 A.D.2d
451, 452, 649 N.Y.S.2d 942, 943 (2d Dep't 1996) (Krausman, J., dissenting) ("[We
are once again faced with the difficult task of attempting to place a dollars-and-
cents valuation on mental pain and suffering, an essentially subjective injury
which is often the only consequence of discriminatory conduct.") (citation omitted).
' This theory presumes that a defendant employer is willing to incur the ex-
pense of making a post-trial motion to reduce a plaintiffs emotional distress dam-
ages after trial. In fact, even if a defendant may not intend to do so, a defendant
may bluff or use the availability of this motion and the results of the spectrum as
leverage in settlement negotiations.
19991
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Toward this end, Part I provides a brief overview of some
of the more frequently litigated federal employment discrim-
ination statutes as well as the New York Human Rights Law.
Geared toward those with little familiarity with employment
discrimination jurisprudence, this Part provides a comparison
of the conduct proscribed and the damages afforded under each
statute.' Next, Part II discusses the general types of harm
that have been a sufficient basis for discrimination plaintiffs'
emotional distress awards. This Part also demonstrates how
easy it is for a discrimination plaintiff to survive summary
judgment, to reach the jury, and to present evidence at trial on
an emotional distress claim that will withstand a motion for a
directed verdict and be sufficient to support a verdict for emo-
tional distress.2' In fact, this Part concludes that, as long as a
plaintiffs testimony is not limited to his or her subjective feel-
ings and describes some physical manifestations of emotional
distress, however slight or transient, the defendant will not be
able to reverse or vacate the jury's verdict on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Finally,
Part III analyzes how plaintiffs' emotional distress awards fare
in this circuit when attacked as excessive under Federal Rule
59. This Part examines federal courts' use of remittitur to
reduce the awards25 and presents the "spectrum" or "continu-
um" of evidence that the federal courts apply to determine a
reasonable amount for a particular emotional distress damage
award. This Part discusses a few of the standard or
"benchmark" decisions which are apparently used by the courts
to define the ends of the spectrum and various points along it.
From this spectrum emerge several categories reflecting a
particular range of damages awarded by the courts for varying
degrees of harm based on the severity of the distress, the na-
ture of the underlying conduct, and how the plaintiff presented
his or her evidence at trial. This spectrum is intended to be
used as a tool by counsel, their clients and courts conducting
settlement conferences to gauge the strength of the plaintiffs
See infra notes 30-108 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 109-177 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 199-417 and accompanying text.
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emotional distress claim in each particular case so that the
expectations of recovery are realistic and will, hopefully, open
the lines of communication during settlement.
I. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL & NEW YORK EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
While the term "Title VII" is virtually synonymous with
employment discrimination, plaintiffs bringing suit in New
York frequently assert discrimination claims pursuant to a
number of other federal statutes, including the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act ("ADEA7),26 the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"),27 and §§ 1981 and 1983 of Title 42 of
the United States Code ("§ 1981" and "§ 1983," respectively),28
and pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law ("the
HRL")." This Part provides a very brief comparison of the
types of conduct proscribed by these statutes and the damages
that are available under each.
A. What Conduct is Prohibited?
Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964," makes it unlaw-
ful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the
basis of his or her race, color, religion, sex or national origin
with respect to decisions to hire, promote, transfer or termi-
nate an employee.3' Title VII does not, however, prohibit an
employer from discriminating against an individual because of
his or her age or disability. Instead, the ADEA, 2 which con-
26 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1994).
27 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12117 (West 1995).
28 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983 (West 1994). There are a number of other federal
statutes under which a disgruntled employee may seek to file an employment
discrimination complaint, including the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 158(b)(2) (West 1998), the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 209 (West 1998), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-55, 92 Stat.
2016 (1978), the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (West
1999), and the Family Medical and Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2614(a)(1)-2614(a)(2), 2615(a)(2)-2615(b) (1993).
29 N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993).
2' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1995), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 104, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
21 See id. § 2000e-(2)(a)(1).
22 Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4, 81 Stat. 603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
1999]
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tains language virtually identical to Title VII," makes it un-
lawful for employers to discriminate against individuals over
the age of forty on the basis of their age when making similar
employment decisions." The ADA prohibits employers from
discriminating against a qualified, disabled individual with
respect to employment decisions because of the individual's
mental or physical disability. 5 Under the ADA, it is unlawful
for an employer to fail to make reasonable accommodations for
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual, unless the employer can demonstrate that making
a reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the employer's business.36
Discrimination claims under these statutes are sometimes
accompanied by claims under §§ 1981 and 1983. Section 1981,
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866," was intended to
uproot the institution of slavery, eradicate its badges and inci-
dents,38 and guarantee the right to "make and enforce con-
tracts" free of intentional discrimination.39 For the last twen-
ty-five years, § 1981 has been applied to remedy private sector
§§ 621-634 (1967)).
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) reads in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . (1) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileg-
es of employment because of such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
" See id. § 631(a); see also Renz v. Grey Adver., Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 221 (2d
Cir. 1997).
35 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1995); see also Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank,
91 F.3d 379, 383 (2d Cir. 1996); Connolley v. Bidermann Indus., U.S.A., Inc., No.
95-1791, 1999 WL 504908, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1999).
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 12115(5)(A).
37 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (originally enacted as Act 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16
Stat. 144, Rev. Stat. 1977), amended by Pub. L. 102-166, tit. I, § 101, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
' See Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Ind. 1977), affd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979).
39 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence and to the full and equal benefits of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
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racial employment discrimination40 and has since been inter-
preted to include employment discrimination based on ethnici-
ty or ancestry.4 Section 1981 does not, however, proscribe
discrimination based on sex or religion.42
Section 1983"3 furnishes a cause of action to remedy vio-
lations of federal rights created by the Constitution" and has
two essential elements: (1) the defendant's conduct must have
occurred while he or she was acting under color of state law45
and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff must
have suffered a denial of federal statutory rights or constitu-
tional rights or privileges.4" Section 1983 is both broader and
more narrow in scope than § 1981. On one hand, § 1983 is
more narrow than § 1981 because since the defendant must be
40 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); see also
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (prohibiting racial
discrimination against white employees).
41 See St. Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). In 1991,
Congress' enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act further expanded the types of
claims which may be brought under § 1981 by adding subsection (b) which ex-
pressly defined the term "make and enforce contracts" to include the "making,
performance, modification and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privilege, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship enjoyment."
42 U.S.C § 1981(b). As presently construed, § 1981 proscribes discrimination for
terminations, failure to promote, harassment and other discriminatory conduct
based on ethnicity and ancestry occurring during the employment relationship. See
David A. Cathcart, Emerging Standards Defining Contract, Emotional Distress and
Punitive Damages in Employment Cases, SB36 ALI-ABA 1507, 1551 (1997).
42 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (dicta).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
" See Quinn v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354,
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,
617 (1979)).
" The traditional definition of acting under color of state law in a § 1983
action requires that the defendant has exercised power "'possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the au-
thority of state law.'" Quinn, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55 (quoting West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
4 See Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1994); Warren v. Fischl,
33 F. Supp. 2d 171, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
1999]
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exercising power vested in him pursuant to state law, it does
not reach private employment discrimination litigation. On the
other hand, § 1983 does not contain any language limiting the
conduct it proscribes, and thus has been applied to a wider
range of discrimination than § 1981, including race discrimi-
nation47 and discrimination based on sex and religion.4
Finally, the HRL, New York's anti-discrimination statute,
prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions and privileges
of employment based on all of the factors prohibited by each of
these federal statutes.49 As discussed below, the presence of
an HRL claim permits a plaintiff to recover damages that may
not be available under a parallel federal statute (such as emo-
tional distress damages on an ADEA claim) and also may per-
mit the plaintiff to evade a statutory cap where the verdict and
damages for emotional distress are awarded pursuant to cer-
tain federal statutes.
"' See Magee v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 27 F. Supp. 2d 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(§ 1983 race discrimination claim).
" See Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994) (§ 1983 can,
in certain circumstances, apply to sex discrimination); Quinn, 53 F. Supp. 2d at
356 (claim of sex discrimination by homosexual police officer against government
employer is covered by § 1983 as an Equal Protection claim); Samuels v. New
York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., No. 94 Civ. 8645, 1997 WL 253209
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1997) (same); see also Ghandour v. American Univ. of Beirut,
No. 97 Civ. 7741, 1998 WL 856114 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1998) (implying plaintiff
could maintain a § 1983 discrimination claim based on religion but dismissing
claim for failure to demonstrate one of the requisite elements); Laufer v. Commu-
nity Sch. Bd. No. 8, 75 Civ. 1256, 1975 WL 3620, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1975)
(plaintiffs claim that his government employer deliberately infringed on his "right
to be free from racial and religious discrimination in his employment within a
public school system . . . is, of course, a violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment").
" Section 296(1)(a) of New York Executive Law provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
For an employer . . . because of age, race, creed, color, national ori-
gin, sex, disability, genetic predisposition or carrier status, or marital
status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to dis-
charge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 1998).
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B. Damages Available to Prevailing Discrimination Plaintiffs
While the purpose behind the compensation scheme in
discrimination statutes is to make victims whole," not every
statute provides a successful plaintiff with the same relief. The
traditional remedies available in employment cases include
awards for back pay (lost salary and benefits that would
have been received had the employment continued), reinstate-
ment and/or front pay, compensatory damages for emotion-
al distress and, in certain circumstances, punitive and
liquidated damages."
1. Back Pay
The purpose of back pay is to place an injured plaintiff in
the same position he or she would have been in but for the
defendant's discriminatory conduct.52 A successful plaintiff
will typically receive an award of back pay, which is available
under Title VII,5" the ADEA,54 the ADA,55 §§ 198156 and
1983, 57 and the HRL.58 Back pay is measured as the amount
" See, e.g., Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 580 (2d Cir.
1989) ("Title VII is the strongest solvent Congress used not only to remove the
stain discrimination leaves on equality in the workplace, but also to make victims
of discrimination whole.").
" See supra note 11.
62 See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1993).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (West 1994) (expressly providing for back
pay).
' The ADEA provides that courts may grant "such legal or equitable relief as
may be approrpriate to effectuate the purpose of this chapter . . . ." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 626(b) (West 1999). This language has been construed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals to explicitly include awards of back pay. See, e.g., Banks v.
Traveler's Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1999); Kirsh v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148
F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 1998); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724,
727-28 (2d Cir. 1984).
" The remedies available under the ADA are the same as those available
under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1995) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4,
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8 and 2000e-9).
5 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
'7 See Frank v. Relin, 851 F. Supp. 87 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (in § 1983 action, em-
ployee fired in violation of constitutional rights was entitled to interest on back
pay award); Blaine v. Board of Trustees, Onondaga Community College, 86 Civ.
903, 1991 WL 487237, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1991) (awarding lost wages to
§ 1983 plaintiff discriminated against by employer in denying her a teaching posi-
tion on the basis of her gender); see also Rao v. New York City Health & Hosps.
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of money that the plaintiff would have received in salary and
benefits from the date of the alleged discriminatory conduct to
the date the judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff.59
Typical back pay awards take into consideration any circum-
stances that would have limited plaintiffs earnings, including
a subsequent disability rendering plaintiff unable to work,6" a
subsequent layoff that would have included plaintiff,61 and
any earnings which plaintiff has received during the interim
from alternative employment. 2 If a discrimination lawsuit is
tried, evidence is likely to be introduced by the parties in sup-
port of a back pay award. Generally, this evidence will consist
of the employer's compensation structure which will be used to
calculate the salary and other fringe benefits the plaintiff
would have received absent the adverse employment action.63
Prior to trial, back pay awards can be estimated by the
litigants by using the salary and benefits plaintiff was earning
at the time of the adverse employment action to calculating
what the plaintiff would have earned had he or she remained
Corp., 882 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
58 See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1190 (2d Cir. 1992)
(upholding back pay awards under N.Y. HRL).
" See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975); Banks v.
Traveler's Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1999); Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148
F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 1998). Under New York law, the appropriate measure for
back pay award is the difference between the amount of salary or wages the
Plaintiff would had received had he continued to work for the Defendant, less any
amount actually earned during the period between the date of discharge and the
date of judgment. See Gleason v. Callanan Indus. Inc., 203 A.D.2d 750, 753, 610
N.Y.S.2d 671, 673-74 (3d Dep't 1994).
See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1993).
61 See Talada v. International Serv. Sys., 899 F. Supp. 936, 959 (N.D.N.Y.
1995).
62 See Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 629 F. Supp. 353, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). Any salary earned between the date of the wrongful action and
the date of judgment is usually deducted from the amount of the back pay award.
See id. at 361.
' See, e.g., Ortiz-Del Valle v. NBA, 42 F. Supp. 2d 334, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(parties introduced conflicting charts into evidence in support of back pay award
reflecting wages plaintiff would have earned absent discrimination); Carter v.
Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., No. 95 Civ. 10439, 1998 WL 150491, at *14-*18 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 1998); Trivedi v. Cooper, No. 95 Civ. 2075, 1996 WL 724743, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996) (denying award of back pay where the parties agreed that
no one promoted in the year the plaintiff was denied promotion had received any
pay increase); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 668-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(affirming back pay award as comporting with formula for back pay proffered by
plaintiff), affd, 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
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in the defendant's employ, accounting for any increases or
decreases plaintiff would have received in each year subse-
quent to the adverse employment action"; and adding the
salary plaintiff would have earned in each year from the time
of the estimation or settlement conference until the date the
parties believe the case will be ready for trial.65
2. Reinstatement or Front Pay
If a discrimination suit reaches trial, a court may also
order the defendant to reinstate a former employee to his or
her position or to the position plaintiff would have had absent
the discrimination.66 Reinstatement may not be feasible
where the plaintiff's position no longer exists, where an inno-
cent third party would be displaced, or where the parties' rela-
tionship is beyond repair. 7 While it is unsettled whether
front pay is a legal or equitable remedy,68 front pay consists of
the salary and benefits the plaintiff would have received from
the date of judgment to a reasonable date in the future but for
the defendant's unlawful conduct.69 An award of front pay is
within the sound discretion of the district court, but it is only
appropriate where the fact finder can predict that the plaintiff
has no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable alternative
employment."0 While front pay and reinstatement are usually
alternative forms of relief, one district court has recently
" This can be accomplished by calculating any salary increases that the plain-
tiff received in prior years or actual increases received by other employees in simi-
lar positions with similar skills for each year.
' For an example of how a back pay award may be calculated, see Luciano v.
Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting formula for back pay
award suggested by plaintiff). In any event, while litigants may disagree over the
method of calculating a particular back pay award for purposes of settlement nego-
tiations and through good faith negotiations, the parties can estimate both a max-
imum and a minimum award.
" See, e.g., Losciale v. The Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., No. 97 Civ. 0704,
1999 WL 587928, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1999); Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp.
1014, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ordering reinstatement even though the plaintiffs job
had technically been abolished because the defendant lacked a rigid corporate
structure).
See Shea, 925 F. Supp. at 1030.
" See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
69 See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1984);
see also Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Org., 980 F.2d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1982).
70 See Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 729.
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awarded both.7 Front pay need not be awarded, however,
when the court determines an award of back pay is sufficient
to make the plaintiff whole.72
During settlement negotiations, defendants should always
explore the possibility of reinstatement. If reinstatement is an
option, it may provide the key to settling a case where a plain-
tiff with relatively few options is more interested in securing
employment or where the relationship between the parties and
at the employer's place of business has not changed significant-
ly since the adverse employment action occurred. Where rein-
statement is possible but does not settle a case, the employer
may attempt to limit its liability to an award for back pay and
emotional distress, and the plaintiff-holding fast to a large
monetary award because he or she is fearful about the uncer-
tainty of his or her future employment-may be more willing to
accept a reduced monetary settlement for any remaining
claims if presented with another employment opportunity.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff accepts reinstatement but the case
proceeds on the remaining claims, the fact that the plaintiff
resumed his or her employment may bear on any emotional
distress claim as a result of his employment, especially in hos-
tile work environment cases.
Where reinstatement is not an option because the nature
of discrimination litigation by an aggrieved employee has exac-
erbated ill-feelings between the parties, the parties should at-
tempt to estimate a range of damages that plaintiff may recov-
er for front pay. Front pay can be estimated in much the same
way that damages for back pay can be calculated, by (1) start-
ing with the plaintiff-employee's salary and benefits at the
time of the employer's adverse employment decision, (2) pre-
dicting the number of years that the plaintiff would have re-
mained in the defendant's employ, and (3) considering the
employer's compensation structure and estimating average
increases in salary and benefits over a number of years in
the future.
With respect to the second factor, where the plaintiffs
employment is defined by an employment contract, the parties
can use the remaining term of the contract to determine how
7' See Losciale, 1999 WL 587928, at *6-*7.
12 See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1993).
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many years the plaintiff would have continued in the
defendant's employ. In cases where a plaintiff is or was em-
ployed at-will, litigants will likely disagree over this factor. At-
will employee-plaintiffs, seeking to maximize a front pay
award, will no doubt take the position that they would have re-
mained in the defendant's employ indefinitely, maybe even
until retirement, and that possibly they would not have retired
at 65, but would have continued as long as their health permit-
ted. Defendants, on the other hand, are apt to argue that any
expectancy by the plaintiff of continued employment is sheer
speculation and that therefore no front pay award is appro-
priate. Any award of front pay will involve some degree of
speculation.73 It is difficult to determine how long a plaintiff
would have worked absent some definitive subsequent event,
such as a disability rendering plaintiff unable to work or a
layoff that would have included plaintiff. However, Second
Circuit case law provides some parameters. In Whittlesey v.
Union Carbide Corp.,74 the seminal case in the Second Circuit
regarding front pay, the Court of Appeals upheld an award of
front pay for a period of four years in favor of a 66-year-old at-
will employee, finding that the facts did not involve some of
the uncertainties which might surround a front pay award to a
younger worker.75 Also, an award of front pay for 20 years is
not on its face speculative76 and has been upheld by at least
one court.77 On the other hand, another district court has
denied front pay awards for periods of 11 and 16 years, to
employees ages 59 and 54, respectively, where it found the
periods contemplated contained uncertainties that were absent
in Whittlesey.78
3. Compensatory Damages
Although an adverse employment decision motivated by
discriminatory animus is likely to cause emotional distress to
"' See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1189 (2d Cir. 1992).
7' 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984).
75 See id. at 729.
"' See Tanzini v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 978 F. Supp. 70, 81 (N.D.N.Y.
1997).
See id.
78 See Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 629 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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an aggrieved employee, including disappointment, loss of self-
esteem, and feelings of insecurity regarding one's ability to
perform his or her job effectively, compensatory damages were
not always available under the various discrimination statutes
for such harm.
Prior to November 21, 1991, compensatory damages were
not available in Title VII or ADA cases. Plaintiffs asserting
claims under these statutes could not recover for the tradition-
al harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and
suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation or other con-
sequential injuries. That year, however, Congress enacted
§ 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,"9 which expressly per-
mits recovery for these injuries provided that the complaining
party cannot recover under § 1981.0 While compensatory
damages are also available under §§ 1981 and 1983" and the
HRL,12 they are not recoverable under the ADEA.83 Because
compensatory damages are not available under the ADEA,
plaintiffs complaining of age discrimination in federal court
frequently assert an age claim under the HRL, which does
provide for these damages.'
79 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (1991).
"0 Section 1981a provides plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages for
"future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
lost of enjoyment of life and other pecuniary losses," arising from intentional dis-
crimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994); see also Johnson v. Tower Air, Inc.,
149 F.R.D. 461, 471 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
" See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-59 (1978) (compensatory damages are
available under § 1983 but only where plaintiff demonstrates proof of actual inju-
ry); Ford v. Nassau County Executive, 41 F. Supp. 2d 392, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(allowing compensatory damages under § 1983); see also Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (entitling § 1981 plaintiff is enti-
tled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory damages).
" The HRL provides for "compensatory damages to the person aggrieved by [a
wrongful employment] practice." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297 (4)(c)(iii) (McKinney 1999);
see Patel vs. Lutheran Med. Ctr., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (plaintiff
entitled to compensatory damages for violation of HRL § 296); Batavia Lodge No.
196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. Of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d
143, 146, 316 N.E.2d 318, 319, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27 (1974).
' See Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 335 (1995); see also Johnson v.
Al Tecksch Specialities Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1984) (compensa-
tory and punitive damages are unavailable under the ADEA).
" See Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (jury award
for pain and suffering was necessarily rendered pursuant to HRL rather than the
ADEA); see also Courtney v. City of New York, 20 F. Supp. 2d 655, 657 (S.D.N.Y.
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4. Punitive and Liquidated Damages
Since 1991, punitive damages have been available in Title
VII and ADA cases85 where the defendant discriminated "with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual." 6 Just this term, in Kolstad
v. American Dental Ass'n,87 the United States Supreme Court
resolved a split among the circuits regarding the appropriate
standard of proof needed to support a claim for punitive dam-
ages in Title VII cases.88 In a 7-2 decision, the Kolstad Court
held that punitive damages may be awarded in a Title VII case
without a showing of both "egregious misconduct" and the
employer's state of mind, endorsing the standard articulated by
the Second Circuit89 and rejecting the standard adopted by
the District of Columbia Circuit ° and the six other circuits
that have addressed the issue.9
Punitive damages are also available in employment dis-
crimination actions brought under §§ 198192 and 1983."' The
standard for punitive damages in actions brought pursuant to
§§ 1981 and 1983 is similar to the standard in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 which applies in Title VII and ADA cases: that is,
where the defendant's conduct is "motivated by evil motive or
1998) (same); Dedyo v. Baker Eng'g N.Y., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7152, 1998 WL 9376
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998) (same).
" See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 669 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)), affd, 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
86 Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
7 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
's The Kolstad Court further held, that the employer may not be held vicari-
ously liable for punitive damages based on a managerial employee's actions if the
employer has made a good faith effort to comply with Title VII. See id. at 2129.
89 See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting
contention that punitive damages requires showing of "extraordinary egregious"
conduct).
90 See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124 ("We credit the en banc majority's effort to
effectuate congressional intent, but in the end, we reject its conclusion that eligi-
bility for punitive damages can only be described in terms of employer's 'egregious'
misconduct.").
91 See Robert P. Lewis, Supreme Court Sets Standard for Punitive Damages
Under Title VII, 222 N.Y. L.J. 1 n.4 (1999).
92 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)
(acknowledging that punitive damages are available in § 1981 employment cases).
83 See Quinn v. County of Nassau, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(jury awarded $380,000 in compensatory and punitive damages in § 1983 employ-
ment discrimination action based on police officer's homosexuality).
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others."94
Punitive damages are not, however, available under the
ADEA. Instead, the ADEA provides that a plaintiff may recov-
er liquidated damages where the employer's violation was
"willful."95 Violations of the ADEA are willful "if the employer
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether
its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."96 Liquidated dam-
ages are awarded in an amount equal to double the plaintiffs
back pay award.97 Finally, the HRL does not provide for ei-
ther liquidated or punitive damages.9"
5. Statutory Caps
The 1991 Civil Rights Act limits a plaintiffs recovery of
emotional distress damages rendered pursuant to Title VII and
the ADA. 9 This mandatory statutory cap ranges from $50,000
" Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 815 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)); see Taylor v. Records, No. 94 Civ. 7689, 1999 WL 124456,
at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1999).
" Paolitto v. John Brown E. & C., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 17, 21 (D. Conn. 1997);
see Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 615 (1993) (holding that "[the
ADEA] provides for liquidated damages where the violation was 'wilfull'").
96 McGinty v. State of New York, No. 98-9060, 1999 WL 777682, at *4 (2d Cir.
Oct. 1, 1999).
97 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994); Dittmann v. Dyno Nobel Inc., No. 97-1724,
1999 WL 727464, at *4-*5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1999); Bonura v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, NA, 629 F. Supp. 353, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Travers v. Coming Glass, 76
F.R.D. 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"' See Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 80 N.Y.2d 490, 496-97, 606 N.E.2d
1369, 1371, 591 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980 (1992).
99 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3) (West 1994). While awards for emotional dis-
tress are expressly subject to the statutory cap, there is currently a split among
the circuits and within the Second Circuit as to whether front pay is legal or
equitable relief and, therefore, subject to the cap. See, e.g., Kramer v. Logan Coun-
ty Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding front pay is equitable remedy
and not compensatory award for lost salary and not subject to statutory cap);
Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1204 (6th Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit has not
addressed this issue. See Rivera v. Baccarat Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). District courts in New York also appear to be split. Compare
Rivera, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 877 (front pay is an equitable remedy and is excluded
from the statutory cap), with Kim v. Dial Serv. Int'l Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-3327,
1997 WL 458783, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997), affd on other grounds, 159 F.3d
347 (2d Cir. 1998) (within the cap). Scholars also continue to grapple with the
scope of the statutory cap. See, e.g., Eileen Kukis, The Future of Front Pay Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Will it be Subject to the Damages Cap, 60 ALB. L.
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to $300,000, depending upon the number of persons employed
by the defendant.' 0 In contrast, there is no cap with respect
to damages awarded under the ADEA, §§ 19810' and
1983,"02 or the HRL.' A plaintiff may assert an HRL claim
for the same conduct complained of under Title VII or the ADA
to avoid the statutory cap.14 In cases where a jury returns a
verdict and a monetary award in excess of the applicable cap, a
number of federal courts in New York have presumed that the
jury has rendered its damage award pursuant to the HRL
claim, rather than the federal claim.0 5 These courts reach
this conclusion by relying on the policy articulated by the Sec-
ond Circuit that in employment cases, plaintiffs should recover
under the theory of liability providing the most complete re-
lief."0 ' Despite the courts' allocation of emotional distress
awards to the HRL to avoid the imposition of a statutory cap,
federal courts resolving Rule 59 remittitur motions rely on
damage awards rendered pursuant to both federal and HRL
law claims. 7
REV. 465 (1996).
" See Kukis, supra note 99, at 467.
101 42 U.S.CAL § 1981a(b)(4).
"e See, e.g., Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding $650,000
compensatory damage award in § 1983 case).
" See, e.g., Anderson v. Yarp Restaurant, Inc., No. 94-7543, 1997 WL 27043, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1997) (allocating compensatory damage award to HRL rather
than Title VII claim and noting that such interpretation permits plaintiff to re-
ceive the full amount without exceeding the legal limits under Title VII).
10 See id.
' See, e.g., Bick v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283, at
*22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998) (allocating the jury's $750,000 award for emotional
distress to plaintiffs HRL claim rather than her Title VII claim) (citing Magee v.
United States Lines, 976 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir. 1992); Anderson, 1997 WL 27043,
at *6-*7).
" See Magee, 976 F.2d at 822.
1 See, e.g., Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014, 1025-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(relying upon federal and state decisions to determine whether damages for emo-
tional distress were excessive under the Human Rights Law, i.e., whether the
award deviates materially from other judgments under the HRL); Trivedi v. Coo-
per, 95 Civ. 2075, 1996 WL 724743, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996) ("I will use
the Federal standard, but will still draw on New York case law in examining the
size of awards given in similar cases.").
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Since it is sometimes difficult to recall what conduct is
prohibited by which statutes, what damages are available
under each, and which statutes are subject to a mandatory
statutory cap, this information is summarized in a chart ap-
pended to the end of this Article."'
II. ALLEGATIONS OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: WHAT HARM Is
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGE
AWARD
The federal courts in this circuit have taken a very lenient
approach with respect to the quality and quantum of proof that
a discrimination plaintiff must produce in order to present
"sufficient evidence" to support an award for emotional dis-
tress. While the federal courts have not joined the New York
Court of Appeals in expressly articulating this policy,"0 9 the
federal courts' relaxed approach becomes evident upon an ex-
amination of: (1) the nature of emotional distress claims and
the types of harm ordinarily alleged by plaintiffs, (2) the ease
with which a plaintiff can present proof of emotional distress
at trial, and (3) the federal courts' routine denial of employer's
post-trial motions to reverse or vacate the emotional distress
award on grounds of insufficient evidence, even where the
evidence of harm presented at trial was scant or thin."0
A. The Nature of Emotional Distress Claims and Types of
Harm
Any time an individual or an employee is not hired, is
terminated, demoted, passed over for a promotion, or is sub-
"o See Appendix, Table 1.
109 See Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. of
Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 316 N.E.2d 318, 319, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 25(1974) (stating where an individual is the victim of intentional discrimination, he
need not produce the quantum or quality of evidence generally required in order
to prove he is entitled to compensatory damages for mental suffering and an-
guish).
110 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Valhalla Anesthesia Assocs., P.C., No. 96 Civ. 6462,1997 WL 669870, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1997) (evidence sufficient to support
plaintiffs emotional distress claim was "undisputably thin"); Trivedi v. Cooper, No.95 Civ. 2075, 1996 WL 724743, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996) (court characterized
evidence which supported plaintiffs emotional distress claim as "scant").
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jected to a work environment that he or she deems hostile, an
employee is apt to experience some type of "distress." At a
minimum, a disgruntled employee is likely to experience hurt
feelings, loss of self-esteem, and either insecurity about his
ability to perform his job adequately or the fear of meeting
present financial responsibilities while obtaining new employ-
ment. Because these are basic human reactions to an
employer's adverse employment decision that will likely be
present even if the employer's decision was not motivated by
discriminatory animus, it is not surprising that plaintiffs often
allege claims for emotional distress in discrimination cases.
While the emotional distress experienced by a discrimina-
tion plaintiff will vary in each case due to a particular
plaintiffs emotional and mental strength and life circumstanc-
es, as well as the duration and severity of employer's con-
duct,"' the types of distress for which plaintiffs seek damag-
es in discrimination cases can be described in general terms.
Discrimination plaintiffs almost always claim the conduct com-
plained of caused them to feel angry or upset, hurt, shocked or
devastated, inadequate and isolated."' Often, plaintiffs also
. See McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 662, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("'[Slensitivity or stoicism, as the case may be, is as variable and individualistic in
its existence and in its degree as human beings.'") (citing Cullen v. Nassau, 53
N.Y.2d 492, 497, 425 N.E.2d 858, 861, 442 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473 (1981)).
" See, e.g., Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1993)
(plaintiff felt inadequate, embarrassed, and "totally exacerbated"); Cowan v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 852 F. Supp. 688, 690 (2d Cir. 1988) (plaintiff felt humiliated);
Mahoney v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., No. 94-CV-2924, 1998 WL 231082, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998) (plaintiff felt extremely disappointed, hurt, embarrassed
and worried); Bick v. City of New York, 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998) (plaintiff felt "devastated"); Leibovitz v. New York City
Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (plaintiff felt anxious and
depressed); Hollis v. City of Buffalo, 28 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(plaintiff felt exhausted and nervous); Carter v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., No. 95
Civ. 10439, 1998 WL 150491, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (plaintiff was very
upset, angry, and "a mess"); Tanzini v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 978 F. Supp
70, 78 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (plaintiff felt shocked, worried, and nervous); Luciano v.
Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 673 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir.
1997) (plaintiff felt hurt, shocked, upset and depressed); Binder v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 847 F. Supp. 1007, 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (plaintiff testified that he
felt "completely alone"); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int'l, No. 96 Civ. 3327, 1997 WL
458783, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (plaintiff felt "gloomy"); McIntosh, 887 F.
Supp. at 664 (plaintiff felt humiliated, shocked, angry, embarrassed, terrible, and
inadequate); Quality Care, Inc. v. Rosa, 194 A.D.2d 610, 611, 599 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66
(2d Dep't 1993) (plaintiff felt devastated, bad, and in a "real pickle"); Cosmos
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complain that they have experienced psychological injuries
such as a loss of self-esteem,"' concern about the future,"'
little desire to socialize," 5 short-tempered-ness," 6 and dete-
riorating family relations."' Plaintiffs also complain of ordi-
nary physical manifestations of their distress, such as sleepless
nights,"' loss of appetite,"' crying, stomach or chest pains
and headaches, 2 1 shortness of breath, hives, and skin blem-
ishes. 2' Finally, on rare occasion, plaintiffs have complained
that the employer's discriminatory conduct resulted in egre-
gious emotional distress manifested by extremely shocking ef-
fects or physical consequences, such as suicide,1 22 heart condi-
tions, or the exacerbation of a pre-existing disease.'23
B. Reaching and Presenting Evidence of Emotional Harm to
the Jury
The few reported summary judgment decisions addressing
emotional distress in employment cases confirm that it is rela-
Forms, Ltd. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 150 A.2d 442, 442, 541 N.Y.S.2d 50,
51 (plaintiff felt emotionally and physically "screwed up").
.. See Cowan, 852 F.2d at 690; Luciano, 912 F. Supp. at 674 (plaintiff felt
purposeless); McIntosh, 887 F. Supp. at 664 (plaintiff felt inadequate because his
wife had to support him).
"' See, e.g., Miner, 999 F.2d at 662 (plaintiff claimed he was unable to provide
for family); Luciano, 912 F. Supp. at 673 (plaintiff was worried about the future);
Binder, 847 F. Supp. at 1028 (plaintiff could not make ends meet).
115 See, e.g., McIntosh, 887 F. Supp. at 664 (plaintiff avoided holidays with fami-
ly because he was embarrassed and ashamed).
.. See Tanzini, 978 F. Supp. at 78.
17 See Miner, 999 F.2d at 662 (tensions among family caused by loss of
plaintiffs job); Cowan, 852 F.2d at 690 (plaintiff reported serious disagreements
with wife).
.. See, e.g., Mahoney, 1998 WL 231082, at *5; Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 153;
Tanzini, 978 F. Supp. at 78; Luciano, 912 F. Supp. at 674; Kim, 1997 WL 458783,
at *14.
. See Luciano, 912 F. Supp. at 674; Kim, 1997 WL 458783, at *14.
121 See Hollis v. City of Buffalo, 28 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (chest
pains, tearful); Carter v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., No. 95 Civ. 10439, 1998 WL
150491, at *20, *23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (tearful, uncontrollable crying,
vomitting); Tanzini, 978 F. Supp. at 78 (headaches); McIntosh, 887 F. Supp. at 664(chest pains, stomach cramps); Luciano, 912 F. Supp. at 673 (crying).
121 See Carter, 1998 WL 150491, at *20.
" See Miner, 992 F.2d at 662 (thoughts of suicide); Bick v. City of New York,
No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283, at *24 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 21, 1998) (suicide ide-
ation).
" See Shea v. Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014, 1022-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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tively easy for a discrimination plaintiff to reach the jury with
respect to an emotional distress claim. In order to survive
summary judgment, a plaintiff must only allege symptoms of
ordinary, transient distress.24 Allegations of hurt feelings,
thoughts of the discriminatory conduct, loss of sleep, and loss
of appetite are sufficient to ensure that the plaintiff will
be given the opportunity to present his or her claim to
the jury.125
It is also relatively simple for a discrimination plaintiff to
present evidence at trial to support a verdict and award for
emotional distress because federal courts require plaintiffs to
produce only minimal evidence to meet their burden of proof
on an emotional distress claim in order to survive a judgment
as a matter of law.
It is well settled that a compensatory damage award for
emotional distress may be based on the plaintiff's testimony
alone.126 Courts have upheld awards for emotional harm in
employment cases where only the plaintiff took the stand and
testified how the adverse employment affected his or her men-
tal or emotional condition.12 A plaintiff does not need to have
consulted a physician or have received medical or psychological
treatment for the alleged distress,'128 nor does plaintiff need
to present any medical proof of his or her distress or harm.29
124 See infra note 125.
"' See, e.g., Dedyo v. Baker Eng'g New York, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7152, 1998 WL
9376, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 13, 1998) (denying motion for summary judgment to
dismiss emotional distress claim without providing explanation for decision); Walk-
er v. AMR Servs. Corp., 971 F. Supp. 110, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying motion
for summary judgment to dismiss emotional distress claim where plaintiffs com-
plaint alleged insomnia, depression, and psychological pain).
126 See Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 847 F. Supp. 1007, 1028 (E.D.N.Y.
1994), affd in part and reversed in part, 57 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 1995); Zerilli v.
New York City Transit Auth., 973 F. Supp 311, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The rule is
the same under New York law. See Bayard v. Riccitelli, 952 F. Supp. 977, 988
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (award may by based on plaintiffs testimony alone) (citing Cullen
v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.Y.2d 492, 497, 425 N.E.2d 858, 860-
61, 442 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473 (1981)).
"= See, e.g., McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (upholding award for emotional harm where the only evidence of mental an-
guish or emotional injury came from the plaintiff himself); see also Zerilli, 973 F.
Supp. at 323; Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 847 F. Supp. 1007, 1028
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
1 See, e.g., Miner, 999 F.2d at 663 ("[A] prescription for medicine or a visit to
a doctor can lend support to a claim for emotional distress; however, such evi-
dence is neither required nor necessarily probative.").
12" See Zerilli, 973 F. Supp. at 323 (rejecting argument that jury award was
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
A plaintiff may, but is also not required to, present lay or ex-
pert witnesses to corroborate his or her testimony.13 Plain-
"sheer speculation" because there was no expert medical testimony; award based
on lay testimony sufficient). The rule is the same under New York law. See New
York City Transit Auth. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207,
216, 573 N.Y.S.2d 49, 54 (1991) ("The existence of a compensable mental injury
may be proved ... by medical testimony where that is available, but psychiatric
or other medical treatment is not a precondition to recovery.").
130 The prevailing view is that corroboration is not necessary. See Broome v.
Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A number of courts have upheld
awards where the evidence of emotional distress was presented solely by plaintiff,
implying that no corroboration is needed. See McIntosh, 887 F. Supp. at 664;
Zerilli, 973 F. Supp. at 323; Binder, 847 F. Supp. at 1028. Some courts have also
implied that corroboration is not needed by articulating a different standard which
implies corroboration is one way to prove emotional distress. See, e.g., Walker v.
AMR Servs. Corp., 971 F. Supp. 110, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("To recover... damag-
es [for emotional distress], a plaintiff must present: a. credible testimony with
respect to the claimed mental anguish; and b. corroboration, either by competent
medical proof or by the circumstances of the case which affords some guarantee of
the germaneness of the claim."); see also Leibovitz v. New York City Transit
Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same).
Although the Second Circuit has not expressly addressed this issue, one re-
cent decision appears to suggest that a plaintiff is required to corroborate his
testimony. See Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 249 (2d Cir. 1998).
In Annis, after the Second Circuit vacated the jury's damage award for emotional
distress on other grounds, see id. at 248-49, the court went one step further and
stated: "We find that the only evidence of Annis's emotional distress-her own
testimony-is insufficient to warrant an award of compensatory damages for that
injury." Id. at 249. While this language appears to suggest that corroboration is
necessary to support an award for emotional distress, at least one district court
has expressly rejected this interpretation of Annis. See Mahoney v. Canada Dry
Bottling Co., No. 94-CV-2924, 1998 WL 231082, at *54 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998)(Block, J.) (stating that Annis should not be read so broadly to require corroborat-
ing testimony); see also Ortiz-Del Valle v. NBA, 42 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341 n.9(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (failing to address whether Annis requires corroboration, but fol-
lowing Mahoney and indicating that Annis should not be read to so broadly). But
see Bick v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283, at *23(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998) (distinguishing Annis from the New York rule and im-
plying that under Annis a plaintiffs own testimony is insufficient to warrant an
award of compensatory damages for mental anguish).
Upon closer scrutiny, however, it appears that the Annis decision has not
altered the traditional principle that an employment discrimination plaintiffs testi-
mony alone is sufficient to support an award for emotional distress. A review of
the evidence presented by Annis at trial, which the Second Circuit failed to ad-
dress in its opinion, reveals that the evidence consisted solely of Annis's subjective
feelings of anger, humiliation, and degradation, and contained no evidence of any
physical harm. See Annis, 939 F. Supp. at 239. Therefore, a more plausible read-
ing of the Second Circuit's decision in Annis is that a plaintiffs uncorroborated
testimony is insufficient where plaintiff fails to present even scant evidence of
physical harm, such as tears, loss of sleep or weight, or stress.
This interpretation is consistent with the prevailing view and subsequent case
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tiffs who choose to corroborate their testimony usually do so
through a spouse or co-employee or someone who has provided
them with counseling or treatment. 3'
The subjective nature of the harm that plaintiffs routinely
claim to have suffered makes it difficult for defendants to dis-
prove a plaintiffs testimony, which may at times be the sole
evidence of harm. Logic dictates that while defense counsel
may thoroughly cross-examine a plaintiff about his or her
testimony, it may be difficult (if not impossible) to disprove or
to raise sufficient doubt as to certain testimony, such as: (1)
the plaintiffs' feelings of sadness, anger and depression; (2) the
occurrence or severity of the plaintiffs' crying episodes; (3) how
often a plaintiff has lost sleep; (4) the frequency of plaintiff's
nightmares and flashbacks; or (5) any loss of appetite and
other similar types of harm. Thus, a jury's finding that a plain-
tiff actually experienced emotional distress (and the jury's
evaluation of the severity of that distress) will often depend on
whether the jury finds the testimony of plaintiff and other
witnesses credible.'32
law interpreting Annis is consistent with this view. See Mahoney, 1998 WL
231082, at *5-*6 (upholding $35,000 emotional distress award where the only phys-
ical manifestations of harm plaintiff suffered were two months of difficulty sleeping
and loss of self-esteem); Ortiz-Del Valle, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 341 n.9 (applying Annis
to dismiss $750,000 emotional distress award in gender discrimination suit where
plaintiff only testified that she "felt ignored" and that her "dreams and goals were
crushed" but failed to present any evidence of physical manifestations of harm).
"' See Zerilli, 973 F. Supp. at 323 (co-workers); Tanzini v. Marine Midland
Bank, N.A., 978 F. Supp. 70, 78 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (wife); Bick, 1998 WL 190283, at
*23 (therapist and co-worker).
" Generally, the standards that govern how a plaintiff may present his or her
proof in support of an emotional distress claim in New York are the same in
other circuits. See Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1251 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting in a racial employment discrimination action under § 1983 that "a survey
of the case law reveals that a plaintiffs testimony, standing alone, may support a
claim of emotional distress") (citing cases); see also Bolden v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 33 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1993) ("W]e are persuaded that the
approach taken by our sister circuits which have dispensed with a requirement of
expert testimony to corroborate a claim for emotional distress is more consistent
with the broad remunerative purpose of the civil rights laws.").
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C. Sufficiency of Evidence of Harm at Trial: How Little is
Enough?
A discrimination plaintiff need not present substantial or
egregious evidence of emotional distress to ensure that his or
her claim is submitted to the jury and that he or she will suc-
ceed on the defendant's post-trial motion challenging the evi-
dence of harm as insufficient. Instead, the plaintiff must pres-
ent only minimal evidence of physical manifestations of the
emotional harm. While it is not clear how little evidence is
sufficient, the parameters are defined by two Second Circuit
decisions directly addressing this issue and other federal trial
court decisions considering defendants' post-trial motions un-
der Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Second Circuit has addressed what evidence is suffi-
cient to support an emotional distress claim in discrimination
cases in Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority133 and
Annis v. County of Westchester."' In Carrero, the Second Cir-
cuit provided some guidance as to what evidence will be suffi-
cient to support an emotional distress claim, while in Annis,
the court of appeals hinted at what evidence of harm is insuffi-
cient as a matter of law.
In Carrero, a Title VII and § 1981 hostile work environ-
ment action, the Second Circuit held that the trial court erred
in finding plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence of
emotional distress and denying plaintiff damages for her dis-
tress."3 5 The court of appeals found that the record reflected
that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of "substantial hu-
miliation, discomfort, stress and anxiety" and that she had
twice visited a doctor and obtained a prescription for Val-
ium.' Carrero also complained to others of anxiety and ner-
vousness, experienced tension in her family relationships, and
suffered a loss of self-confidence. 37 Furthermore, Carrero's
co-workers independently supported her testimony that she
890 F.2d 569, 581 (2d Cir. 1989).
13 136 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1998).
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had cried. 3' The Second Circuit held that this proof was not
speculative and, if credible, was sufficient to support an award
of emotional distress. 139
In contrast, in January 1998, in Annis,40 the Second Cir-
cuit held that the evidence presented in support of plaintiff's
emotional distress claim was insufficient as a matter of law to
support the jury's verdict.' The plaintiff prevailed on her
§ 1983 gender discrimination claim and the jury awarded her
$266,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering
against the County of Westchester and the former police com-
missioner for having been subjected to a hostile work environ-
ment.4 2 The district court remitted the plaintiff's award for
emotional distress to $100,001.13 The County appealed.'
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case for a new
trial on damages on other grounds,45 but not before it ruled:
[W]e find that the only evidence of Annis's emotional distress-her
own testimony-is insufficient to warrant an award of compensatory
damages for that injury. She has not alleged any physical manifesta-
tions of her emotional distress, and, despite the discrimination, she
remained a lieutenant with the County Police .... She testified that
she needs and has had counseling, but introduced no affidavit or
other evidence to corroborate her testimony. In short, her testimony
fails to establish that she suffers from any concrete emotional prob-
lems.146
Nowhere in the Annis decision does the Second Circuit
discuss the evidence of harm, if any, which Annis presented at
trial. 47 The court also provides no guidance as to what kinds
of physical manifestations of distress would be sufficient, or
what types of problems are "concrete emotional problems."48
The Annis court's failure to provide any context for its state-
ments leaves open the question of how much evidence a dis-
13 See id.
139 See id.
'40 136 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1998).
141 See id. at 251.
142 See Annis v. County of Westchester, 939 F. Supp. 1115, 1118 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
143 See id. at 1121.
'" See Annis, 136 F.3d at 239.
143 See id. at 248.
14 Id. at 249 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).




crimination plaintiff must present to defeat a motion for a
directed verdict on an emotional distress claim. A review of the
trial court's decision reveals that the only evidence of harm
presented at trial consisted of Annis' own testimony about her
feelings. Annis testified that she had felt "angry," "very hu-
miliated," "degraded," and "very upset" after being insulted
with profane language and after being told by a supervisor
that he did not "give into any of this women's liberation
sh-t.""' Therefore, a more plausible reading of Annis is that
a claim for emotional distress will be insufficient as a matter
of law only where the record is devoid of any evidence of physi-
cal manifestation of harm. Although the Second Circuit did not
expressly use this language, it is a more reasonable interpreta-
tion of Annis, is consistent with the few reported cases inter-
preting Annis for the sufficiency of plaintiffs evidence of emo-
tional distress,5 ' and the numerous decisions rendered prior
to Annis which upheld verdicts for emotional distress support-
ed by evidence of harm far less substantial than was deemed
sufficient to support an award for distress by the Second Cir-
cuit in Carrero.'5'
For instance, in Mahoney v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.,152
the district court rejected the defendant's argument that
Mahoney's claim for distress was based on insufficient evidence
in light of Annis.55 The district court rejected this argument
and distinguished Annis by finding that Mahoney's evidence
was sufficient because he had suffered sleepless nights for at
least two months. 54 While Mahoney's loss of sleep may have
"' Annis, 136 F.3d at 242.
.50 See Mahoney v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., No. 94-CV-2924, 1998 WL 231082
(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998) (distinguishing Annis to uphold $35,000 emotional distress
award; unlike the plaintiff in Annis, plaintiff presented minimal evidence of physi-
cal manifestations of harm, including loss of self-esteem and sleep); cf Ortiz-Del
Valle v. NBA, 42 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying Annis to
dismiss $750,000 emotional distress award under Title VII in gender discrimina-'
tion suit where plaintiff had testified that she felt ignored and that her "dreams
and goals were crushed"; like the plaintiff in Annis, plaintiff failed to present any
evidence of physical manifestations of harm).
' See, e.g., Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1993); Cowan
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1988); Binder v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 847 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 57 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1995).
102 No. 94 Civ. 2924, 1998 WL 231082 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998).
15 See id. at *5.
154 See id.
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been considered a "physical manifestation" of his harm, which
had been lacking in Annis, Mahoney's only other evidence of
emotional harm consisted of his feelings of disappointment and
embarrasment"' and, therefore, was just as sparse as the
evidence presented in Annis.
Similarly, in another case decided after Annis, Ortiz-Del
Valle v. National Basketball Ass'n,"5 6 the district court ap-
plied Annis to dismiss plaintiff's emotional distress claim,
finding that plaintiff was not entitled to any compensatory
damages.15 In Ortiz-Del Valle, the National Basketball Asso-
ciation ("NBA") was found to have discriminated against a
female basketball referee in violation of Title VII and the HRL
when it refused to hire her because of her gender."5 8 The jury
awarded Ortiz-Del Valle $850,000 in compensatory damages,
including $750,000 for emotional distress.5 9 The NBA, rely-
ing on-Annis, moved the court for judgment as a matter of law
that Ortiz-Del Valle was not entitled to any compensatory
damages." Defendants argued that the award "[was] based
solely on plaintiff's self-serving testimony that she felt ignored,
that her 'dreams and goals were crushed."""' The district
court agreed that this testimony was clearly insufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that plaintiff suffered from concrete
emotional problems, noting that "in this case, as in Annis, the
only evidence of plaintiff's emotional distress was her own
testimony."'62 The court noted that Ortiz-Del Valle, like
Annis, offered no testimony about any physical manifestation
"s See id.
15 42 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
57 See id at 341. It should be noted that while the Ortiz-Del Valle court held
plaintiff was not entitled to damages for emotional distress under Title VII, pursu-
ant to the Annis decision, the court found that plaintiffs evidence was sufficient to
support a $20,000 award for her emotional distress on her HRL claim. See id. at
342. The Ortiz-Del Valle court appears to be the first to draw such a distinction,
thereby suggesting that the federal standard for proof of emotional harm is more
stringent than the standard applied by the state courts. Notably, the Ortiz-Del
Valle court cites no authority in support of its distinction.
8 See id. at 336.
159 See id.





of her emotional damage, nor did she offer any evidence that
she needed or has undergone any psychiatric treatment."3
Therefore, it appears that in the wake of Annis, as long as
a plaintiffs claim is not based solely on his or her subjective
feelings and if the plaintiff describes some physical manifesta-
tions of emotional distress, however slight or transient, plain-
tiff will survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Where the jury accepts the plaintiffs proof of emotional
distress and renders an award for pain and suffering, defen-
dants may, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50
and 59, move to reverse or vacate the verdict, respectively, on
the grounds that the verdict was not supported by sufficient
evidence of harm." Defendants moving for judgment as a
matter of law ("JMOL")'T ' under Rule 50 bear a heavy bur-
den. 6 When deciding such motions, the court cannot weigh
the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute
its judgment of the facts for that of a jury.'67 The court must
also construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and must give considerable deference to the jury's
determinations. 68 JMOL may only be properly granted where
either:
(1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the ver-
dict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer
surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming
amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair-
minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it]. 169
' See id.
'" See id. at 334-44.
16 Rule 50(2)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue
against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law against that party with respect to a claim . .. that cannot under
the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding
on that issue.
FED. R. CiV. P. 50(2)(1).
' See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 667 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd,
110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
' See Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 985 F.2d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1993).
See Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc. 985 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1993).
169 Carter v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., No. 95 Civ. 10439, 1998 WL 150491, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (citations omitted).
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Finally, district courts have been cautioned to be mindful that
motions pursuant to Rule 50 should be "sparingly granted."17
0
Similarly, employers moving simultaneously under Rule 59
for a new trial on grounds that the jury's verdict was "against
the weight of the evidence," 17' a "seriously erroneous re-
sult,"'72 or a "miscarriage of justice" 73 are not likely to have
a higher success rate. Although under Rule 59, the district
court is free to weigh the evidence, need not view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,74 and may order a
new trial even if there is "substantial" evidence to support the
jury verdict,7 5 the court must not set aside the verdict and
grant a new trial on liability where the resolution of the issues
depends on the assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses. 1 6 In light of these stringent standards, the high
subjectivity of plaintiffs proof, the fact that such claims often
turn on the credibility of the witnesses, and the minimal
amount of evidence that will sustain the jury's verdict, it is
not surprising that defendants are often unsuccessful on
these motions.
77
Therefore, once a discrimination plaintiff alleges emotional
distress, he or she will likely reach the jury, and if he or she
presents minimal evidence of harm, it is unlikely that the
defendant will be successful in challenging the verdict. Where
a jury awards a plaintiff a substantial sum for emotional dis-
tress, the playing field is somewhat leveled, however, by the
defendants' ability to move under Rule 59 for a new trial on
damages and for remittitur on the ground that the damages
170 Weldy, 985 F.2d at 59 (citations omitted).
... Mahoney v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., No. 94 Civ. 2924, 1998 WL 231082, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998).
17 U.S. East Telecomm., Inc. v. U.S. West Communications Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d
1289, 1301 (2d Cir. 1994); Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d 332, 344 (2d Cir. 1993).
17 Sorlocco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 875 (2d Cir. 1992);
Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Carter, 1998 WL
150491, at *4.
17. See Song v. Ives Labs., Inc. 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992).
175 See id.
176 See Piesco, 12 F.3d at 345.
17 See, e.g., Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d. 205, 223-24 (N.D.N.Y.
1999); Bick v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998); Perdue v. City Univ., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326, 337 (E.D.N.Y.




are excessive. This is the defendant-employer's last chance to
escape a substantial award for plaintiffs distress.
III. REMITnITuR AND REMITTED DAMAGE AWARDS: A SURVEY
OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S VALUATION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CLAIMS IN EMPLOYMENT CASES
The legal principles that federal courts apply in determin-
ing whether a defendant is entitled to a remittitur of a damage
award have resulted in the emergence of a spectrum of emo-
tional distress claims and corresponding damage awards in the
Second Circuit. This Part explains the rules courts follow in
determining whether to remit a damage award and then it sets
forth the various categories along the spectrum to provide
litigants with a reasonable gauge for measuring the strength of
a particular plaintiffs emotional distress claim.
A. Rule 59 Motion for New Trial on Damages and Remittitur
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues ... in an action in which there has been a trial by
jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United
States.1 8
An excessive damage award is one of the grounds which war-
rants a new trial under Rule 59.1 9 The determination of
whether a verdict is excessive is committed to the discretion of
the trial court.18 If the court determines that a verdict is ex-
cessive, it cannot simply reduce the award accordingly."'1 In-
178 FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a).
179 See Tanzini v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 978 F. Supp. 70, 77 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) ("If a district court finds a verdict is excessive, it may order a new tri-
al .... ") (citing Tingley Sys., Inc. v. Norse Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir.
1995)). Courts may also grant a new trial, for example, where the verdict is a
miscarriage of justice, see Atkins v. New York City, 143 F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir.
1998), or where the jury was not adequately instructed on issues essential to the
case. See Hilord Chem. Corp. v. Ricoh Elecs., Inc., 875 F.2d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir.
1989).
" See U.S East Telecomm., Inc. v. U.S. West Telecomm. Servs., Inc., 38 F.3d
1289, 1301 (2d Cir. 1994); Connolly v. Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., Inc., No. 95 Civ.
1791, 1999 WL 504908, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1999).
181 See Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1997)
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stead, the court may either order a new trial on liability or
damages, or under the practice of remittitur, it may condition
the denial of a motion of a new trial on the plaintiffs accep-
tance of a reduced damage award.'82 "Remittitur" is simply
"'the process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose
between reduction of an excessive verdict and a new trial'"
on damages."
Before a court orders a plaintiff to choose a remitted
award or a new trial, it must first determine whether the ver-
dict is excessive. Although it is well-settled that juries have a
great amount of discretion in deciding whether to award dam-
ages"& and that the calculation of damages on a given claim
is properly within the jury's province,'85 it is equally well-
settled that there is "an upper limit [on damages on a given
claim,] and whether that has been surpassed is not a question
of fact with respect to which reasonable [persons] may differ,
but a question of law."'86 Furthermore, while courts pay def-
erence to a jury's broad discretion to award damages, a jury
cannot "abandon analysis for sympathy for a suffering plaintiff
and treat an injury as though it were a winning lottery tick-
et.""'87 A court will not permit a verdict to stand if it appears
(trial court's reduction of jury award without offering plaintiff option of new trial
on damages constituted a denial of plaintiffs constitutional right to a jury trial
and was error).
82 See Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1996); Tingley Sys., Inc. v.
Norse Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1995).
"8 Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted); Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations
omitted); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int'l, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3327, 1997 WL 458783, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (citations omitted).
'" See Bick v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998).
" See Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990); Carter v. Rosenberg
& Estis, P.C., No. 95 Civ. 10439, 1998 WL 150491, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
1998); Kim, 1997 WL 458783, at *6.
1' Kim, 1997 WL 458783, at *6; Mazyck v. L.I.R.R., 896 F. Supp. 1330, 1336
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Dagnello v. L.I.R.R., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir. 1961)).




to be "motivated by passion or prejudice rather than a rea-
soned assessment of the evidence of injury presented at tri-
al"' 8 or if it represents a windfall to the plaintiff without re-
gard for the actual injury.'89
The standard that federal courts apply to determine
whether an award is excessive depends on whether the plain-
tiff has been awarded damages on a federal or HRL discrimi-
nation claim.' 0 When assessing awards rendered pursuant to
federal law, the court will find a verdict excessive if it "shocks
the judicial conscience."191  Where the award is rendered
pursuant to the HRL, the federal court will apply the New
York standard, under which an award of damages is
excessive if it "deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation."'92
To determine whether a particular jury award shocks the
judicial conscience or materially deviates from other awards,
trial courts are guided by emotional distress damage awards
rendered in "similar cases,"'93 paying attention to the particu-
lar facts and circumstances of the other cases and comparing
them to the current case."9 Because the Second Circuit has
held that a court should not limit its review of other awards to
cases involving the same cause of action,'95 the term "similar
1- Bick, 1998 WL 190283, at *20 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Ramirez
v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 112 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1997)).
"' See Carter, 1998 WL 150491, at *5.
" See Bick, 1998 WL 190283, at *21 (citing Gasperini v. Center for Humani-
ties, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996)).
191 Scala, 985 F.2d at 680. In diversity cases, a federal court must apply New
York law to determine the excessiveness of a damage award. See Gasperini, 518
U.S. at 431. Furthermore, where federal courts consider the excessiveness of dam-
ages rendered pursuant to the HRL, federal courts look to remitted awards in
both federal and New York cases interpreting the HRL. See, e.g., Trivedi v. Coo-
per, 95 Civ. 2075, 1996 WL 724743, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996); Shea v.
Icelandair, 925 F. Supp. 1014, 1025-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Under New York law, the
standard applied by the court to determine excessiveness is whether the award
"deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 5501(c) (McKinney 1995). The New York standard is less deferential to the jury's
verdict than the federal standard. See Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., 72
F.3d 1003, 1011 (2d Cir. 1995).
1 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c); see Shea, 925 F. Supp at 1021.
Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 812 (2d Cir. 1996); Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d
183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990).
19, See Scala, 985 F.2d at 684.
"9' See Ismail, 899 F.2d at 186.
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cases" appears to refer to the quality of the plaintiffs proof and
not similar discriminatory conduct. Courts have also been cau-
tioned against determining whether a verdict is excessive by
"[balancing] the number of high and low awards and [rejecting]
the verdict in the instant case if the number of lower awards is
greater" to determine excessiveness.196
Where the damage award shocks the judicial conscience or
materially deviates from what would be reasonable compensa-
tion, the trial court must then remit the award to the maxi-
mum amount that would not be excessive. 9 ' If a plaintiff
agrees to accept remittitur he is ordinarily precluded from
challenging it on appeal.
B. Remittitur of Emotional Distress Claims in the Second
Circuit9 '
1. Generally
A review of recent case law in the Second Circuit reveals
that, as a result of the federal courts' practice of looking to
each other for guidance to determine whether an emotional
distress award is excessive and to determine the amount to
which an award should be remitted, a "spectrum" or "continu-
um" of emotional distress claims has emerged. This spectrum
reflects the range of remitted damage awards based on particu-
lar quantums of harm and the manner by which the plaintiff
presents his or her evidence of harm. The existence of this
continuum, which ranges from "garden-variety" emotional
19 Id. at 187.
197 See Pescatore v. Pan Amercian World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 18 (2d Cir. 1996)
(in federal question cases, the district court has the discretion to find an award
excessive if it "shock[s] the judicial conscience'") (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1330 (2d Cir. 1990); Kim
v. Dial Serv. Int'l, No. 96 Civ. 3327, 1997 WL 458783, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,
1997), affd, 159 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1030 (1999).
19' Gardner v. Federated Dep't Stores, 907 F.2d 1348, 1354 (2d Cir. 1990). Sta-
tistics reflecting how often plaintiffs have accepted a remitted award rather than
electing to proceed with a new trial' would require conducting a case-by-case analy-
sis of the docket. While these statistics would be interesting, this data is not nec-
essary for the narrow purpose of this Article, which is to provide litigants with an
understanding of what a federal court may determine a particular emotional dis-
tress claim is worth at the conclusion of the trial so that litigants can estimate
the value of such claims prior to undertaking the task of preparing for trial.
1999]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
distress claims on one end of the continuum to "egregious"
distress claims on the other, has been acknowledged and ap-
plied by a number of federal district courts in this circuit to re-
solve motions for remittitur."9 A review of the case law fur-
ther reveals that federal courts routinely rely on a number of
"benchmark" cases to evaluate the quality of proof and the
value of the emotional distress award challenged. This Section
presents the spectrum by discussing those cases repeatedly
relied upon by federal courts in the Second Circuit to resolve
these motions. It is designed to provide litigants with insight
into the various ranges of damages the courts have created
through the tool of remittitur. This section analyzes and dis-
cusses each case with respect to the statutory basis for the dis-
criminatory claim, the evidence of harm presented by plaintiff
at trial, the damages awarded by the jury for emotional dis-
tress, the court's valuation of plaintiffs harm and the remitted
emotional distress award. However, for the reader's conve-
nience, Table 2 at the end of this Article summarizes this in-
formation in a chart so that this continuum can be applied in a
practical manner by litigants and by courts conducting settle-
ment conferences to evaluate a particular distress claim.00
2. The Damage Award Continuum
At the low end of the continuum are what have become
known as "garden-variety" distress claims in which district
courts have awarded damages for emotional distress ranging
from $5,000 to $35,000. "Garden-variety" remitted awards have
typically been rendered in cases where the evidence of harm
was presented primarily through the testimony of the plaintiff,
who describes his or her distress in vague or conclusory terms
and fails to describe the severity or consequences of the inju-
ry.'o' For purposes of this Article, the garden-variety claims
'" Bick v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283, at *26
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998); Kim, 1997 WL 458783, at *12-*14; Shea v. Icelandair,
925 F. Supp. 1014, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 887 F.
Supp. 662, 666-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
200 See Appendix, Table 2.
21 See Bick, 1998 WL 190283, at *25.
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have been divided into low-end garden-variety claims
($5,000-$15,000 awards) and high-end garden-variety claims
($20,000-$35,000).
The middle of the spectrum consists of "significant"
($50,000 up to $100,000) and "substantial" emotional distress
claims ($100,000). These claims differ from the garden-variety
claims in that they are based on more substantial harm or
more offensive conduct, are sometimes supported by medical
testimony or evidence, evidence of treatment by a healthcare
professional and/or medication, and testimony from other,
corroborating witnesses.
Finally, on the high end of the spectrum are "egregious"
emotional distress claims, where the courts have upheld or
remitted awards for distress to a sum in excess of $100,000.
These awards have only been warranted where the discrimina-
tory conduct was outrageous and shocking or where the physi-
cal health of plaintiff was significantly affected.
a. Low-End "Garden-Variety" Distress Claims
At the low end of the continuum are emotional distress
claims supported by evidence consisting primarily of plaintiffs
vague, conclusory testimony of distress, including feelings of
disappointment, shock, devastation, and anger. The cases that
fall into this category and are frequently relied on to establish
this end of the continuum include: Binder v. Long Island
Lighting Co.,22 Luciano v. Olsten Corp.,23 Miner v. City of
Glens Falls,"°4 Cowan v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Ameri-
ca,"5 Borja-Fierro v. Girozentrale Vienna Bank,"6 and Cart-
er v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C.2"' In these cases, courts have
awarded damages ranging from $5,000 to $15,000.
While the federal courts resolving remittitur motions have
also relied on a number of standard New' York state court
cases reducing emotional distress awards, this discussion fo-
22 847 F. Supp. 1007, 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 57 F.3d
193 (2d Cir. 1995).
2" 912 F. Supp. 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
204 999 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1993).
20 852 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1988).
20 No. 91 Civ. 8743, 1994 WL 240360 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1994).
2'7 No. 95 Civ. 10439, 1998 WL 150491 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998).
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cuses only on the federal cases because state decisions are
typically devoid of any explanation as to the nature and extent
of the emotional distress, the evidence of harm presented at
trial to support the claim of distress, or the courts' reasoning
in remitting the damages awards. °8
In Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co.,29 an age discrimi-
nation suit brought under the ADEA and the HRL by an engi-
neer, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's remittitur
of a $498,000 jury award for emotional distress to $5,000.211
Plaintiff, who was 58 years old and who had worked for Long
Island Lighting Company ("LILCO") for over 30 years at the
time he was terminated, prevailed on his claim that the defen-
dant had wrongfully terminated him because of his age and
had refused to find him similar employment within the compa-
ny while other positions were given to younger employees.21'
Plaintiff's testimony was the only evidence presented in sup-
port of his emotional distress claim and was limited to feelings
of isolation and inadequacy.212 Plaintiff testified that "'it was
difficult to get started,'" that he "'couldn't make ends meet,"'
that his emotional distress stemmed from his "'inability to
support [his] family,'" and that he "'was completely alone.' 213
Plaintiff further testified that he "'resented the fact that [he]
208 See, e.g., Quality Care, Inc. v. Rosa, 194 A.D.2d 610, 611, 599 N.Y.S.2d 65,
66 (2d Dep't 1993) (plaintiff testified that she was "shock[ed],'" "devastated,'" "felt
bad," and "'in a real pickle,'" but absent any testimony regarding the duration,
severity of consequences of plaintiffs condition, or evidence of any medical treat-
ment, award of $10,000 was reduced to an award not to exceed $5,000) (alteration
in original); New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Dis-
abilities v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 183 A.D.2d 943, 583 N.Y.S.2d
580 (3d Dep't 1992) (reducing award from $75,000 to $7,500); New York City
Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 160 A.D.2d 874, 554 N.Y.S.2d 308,
amended by 560 N.Y.S.2d 880 (2d Dep't 1990) (reducing award from $75,000 to
$5,000); Empbanque Capital Corp. v. white, 158 A.D.2d 686, 551 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d
Dep't 1990) (reducing award from $35,000 to $5,000); Cosmos Forms, Ltd v. State
Div. of Human Rights, 150 A.D.2d 442, 442, 541 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (2d Dep't 1989)
(where plaintiff testified to feeling "'[e]motionally and physically screwed up,'" the
court reduced the jury's award of $35,000 to $5,000).
2o9 Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 847 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 57 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 1995).
211 See id. at 1009.
21 See id.
212 See id. at 1028.
213 Id.
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was pushed out."'214 Plaintiff failed to describe any physical
manifestations of harm.215 The district court held that the
award, based solely on the plaintiffs own limited testimony of
emotional distress, was "grossly excessive" and reduced the
award to $5,000.216
In Miner v. City of Glens Falls,2 7 the Second Circuit up-
held the district court's determination that a slightly higher
award than that rendered in Binder was appropriate.218 In
Miner, the district court found that a $12,500 award in a
§ 1983 suit was not excessive for a police officer who was ter-
minated without due process after "forming a religious scruple
against carrying a firearm. "12" After awarding plaintiff sum-
mary judgment, the district court had held a two-day damage
trial and awarded Miner $12,500 for his distress. Defendant
appealed, arguing that only nominal damages should have
been awarded.
At the trial on damages, Miner and his wife testified about
the nature and extent of his actual injuries.2 ' Miner testified
that he experienced feelings of inadequacy as a result of being
unable to provide for his family, embarrassment while apply-
ing for public assistance in the presence of people who knew he
had been a police officer, and stress caused by having to sell
his newly purchased house. 2 Miner had also stated that he
had considered committing suicide because he felt "totally
exasperated with the situation."223 Miner's wife testified
about the effects of the job loss on the family's relationship and
how his termination had caused tension between them.22
The defendants presented no evidence at the damage trial.
22 5
214 Binder, 847 F. Supp. at 1028.
21 See id. In light of the Second Circuit's decision in Annis v. County of
Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 251 (2d Cir. 1998), it is unlikely that the evidence
Binder presented to establish his distress would now be sufficient to withstand a
judgment as a matter of law. See supra notes 133-164 and accompanying text.
216 See Binder, 847 F. Supp. at 1028.
217 999 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1993).
218 Id. at 662-63.
219 Id. at 663.
" See id. at 662.
221 See id. at 659, 662.
2 See Miner, 999 F.2d at 662.
223 Id.
" See id.
222 See id. at 659.
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On appeal, based on this evidence, the Second Circuit held
that, except for Miner's thoughts of suicide, the anguish Miner
had described had some objective correlation with events de-
scribed by him and his wife,22' and concluded that the district
court's award of $12,500 was consistent with the magnitude of
Miner's subjective injuries.227
A similar award was upheld in Luciano v. Olsten
Corp.,221 in which plaintiff, a successful executive, prevailed
on her claims under Title VII and the HRL that her employer
discriminated against her on the basis of her gender when she
was both denied a promised promotion to vice-president and
fired.22 9 Luciano was awarded $11,400 for her emotional dis-
tress.2 10 The defendant moved to remit the award to $5,000
and, relying principally on Binder, argued that the plaintiffs
"garden-variety claim" could not exceed $5,000.1 The district
court, rejecting this argument, distinguished Binder by finding
that Luciano had presented adequate evidence to support the
jury's award of $11,400 for emotional distress.232 Although
the only evidence of Luciano's harm consisted of her testimony
that she felt "hurt, shocked, upset, and overcome with sad-
ness," Luciano also testified that she experienced a number of
ordinary physical manifestations of harm."' Specifically, "she
cried, worried about finances, had trouble sleeping and eating,
and felt purposeless." 4 The Luciano court not only refused
to reduce the $11,400 award, finding the evidentiary basis ade-
quate, but it also opined that the evidence presented could
have supported a damage award higher than $11,400.235
There are three reported decisions, spanning a little more
than a decade, in which courts have held that a $15,000 emo-
tional distress award is appropriate. In Cowan v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America, 6 an African-American insurance
2" See id. at 663.
22 See Miner, 999 F.2d at 663.
912 F. Supp. 663 (E.D.N.Y.1996), affd, 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
2' See id. at 666-67.
230 Id. at 667.
23' Id. at 673.
See id.
Luciano, 912 F. Supp. at 673-74.
23 Id.
' See id. at 673.
21 852 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1988).
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agent was passed over for promotion several times in favor of
caucasian employees and was ultimately fired. Cowan pre-
vailed on his race discrimination claims under Title VII and
§ 1981 and was awarded $15,000 for his emotional
distress."7 The Second Circuit affirmed the award based on
Cowan's testimony that his employer's failure to promote him
caused him severe emotional distress, humiliation, and loss of
self-esteem.23 He further testified that his distress had
caused his home life to suffer, spurred "serious disagreements"
with his wife, and caused him to begin "drinking heavily."" 9
Cowan's testimony was corroborated by his co-workers and his
wife." ° The district court determined that a $15,000 award
was appropriate, finding that Cowan had caused some of his
own humiliation and difficulties with co-workers and that he
had declined to seek counseling.24
In Borja-Fierro v. Girozentrale Vienna Bank,242 although
the district court held that plaintiff had been harassed based
on his race and national origin and had been fired in retalia-
tion for complaining, the court remitted the jury's $180,000
award for emotional distress to $15,000.243 Borja-Fierro was
the only witness that had testified about his emotional dis-
tress.2 The district court noted that Boija-Fierro's testimony
had been "brief," "not particularly strong," and contained only
a single reference to a visit to a psychologist.245 Boija-Fierro
also testified that his distress resulted from a combination of
the problem he had at his job and a prior car accident.246 The
district court characterized his testimony as "vague and
conclusory" and, after reviewing many state and federal court
decisions, could find no award in a similar case which awarded
more than $15,000 for similar evidence of harm.247
See id. at 689.
See id. at 690.
29 Id.
2"0 See id.
24. See Cowan, 852 F.2d at 690-91.
242 No. 91 Civ. 8743, 1994 WL 240360 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1994).
" See id. at *2, *4.
2" See id. at *3.
25 Id.
21 See id.
247 Borja-Fierro, 1994 WL 240360, at *4.
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Most recently, in Carter v. Rosenberg & Estis, P.C.,24 the
Southern District of New York reduced a $175,000 award to
$15,000 where the plaintiff prevailed on a hostile work envi-
ronment claim under Title VII but had presented only minimal
evidence of harm. 9 Carter had testified that after she was
terminated, she was ultimately forced to move out of her
apartment and to sell, give away, or place in storage many of
her possessions, including her furniture and her son's toys."'
Money was "[viery tight" during this period and she "could not
afford to maintain the apartment and [her] life ... on unem-
ployment.""' The court noted that Carter's testimony-with
two exceptions discussed below-comprised the only testimony
of her emotional distress.2 The sum total of that testimony
was Carter's affirmation that she was "very upset," "a mess,"
and experienced a lot of "uncontrollable crying."253 Carter fur-
ther testified that she participated in weekly treatment ses-
sions for approximately one year with "a sexual harassment
expert."254 Carter offered no testimony, however, as to the
emotions she experienced while attending the group ses-
sions, or whether they had any beneficial impact on her
mental state.255
Carter's statements regarding her physical condition made
clear that the physical manifestations she suffered were "mini-
mal, if any."'256 Specifically, she claimed that she felt "very
tired," had undergone blood tests, and vomited on two or three
occasions."' Also, two days before she was fired, Carter felt
physically ill due in part to a pulled back muscle." Although
she claimed that her "chest constricted" and she thought that
she was having a heart attack, the court found there was no
2- No. 95 Civ. 10439, 1998 WL 150491 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998).
249 See id. at *23-*25
250 See id. at *19.
251 Id.
22 See id. at *20.





211 See Carter, 1998 WL 150491, at *20.
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indication in the record that Carter's "chest constriction" was
in any way related to her termination, which had occurred
some five months earlierY. 9
The district court also discredited the testimony of the
social worker and physician that testified on Carter's be-
half."' The social worker's testimony consisted of her obser-
vations of minimal harm couched in vague terms.26' She tes-
tified that in group sessions Carter appeared "very anxious,"
"tearful at times," "very fidgety and hyper," "very sad," and
"very angry."262 There had also been "a deterioration in Ms.
Carter's appearance" because "she became disheveled" and had
skin problems.26 The testimony of Carter's medical expert, a
professor of counseling psychology at New York University,
was also vague. The physician, who had interviewed Carter for
only six hours more than a year-and-a-half after the alleged
discrimination occurred, testified only that Carter was "very,
very concerned and upset over her firing," that she was "ex-
tremely stressed," and that he thought that the experience had
been "emotionally upsetting to her."2
According to the district court, Carter presented neither
the quality nor quantity of evidence to support a $75,000
award.265 The district court, relying on Binder, Miner, Cowan,
and Luciano held that the $75,000 award shocked the judicial
conscience.266 The Carter court specifically noted that, as in
many of the cases, the award here was based almost entirely
on the testimony of the plaintiff alone.267 The court further
noted that the difficulty for Carter was that, absent further
corroborating testimony regarding her mental anguish, her
own limited statements on this subject were entirely insuffi-
cient to support the damage award because she gave no indica-
tion, or at least gave altogether inadequate detail, as to the





21 Carter, 1998 WL 150491, at *20.
264 Id.
262 See id. at *21.
266 See id. at *21-*23.
26 See id. at *23.
26 See Carter, 1998 WL 150491, at *23.
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The court characterized Carter's testimony as alluding only to
"extremely minor perceived physical ailments (often proven
unfounded)" that could have been related to either her
termination or her mental distress from that event.269
Most importantly,
Carter offered no testimony that she suffered any of the sorts of
serious mental and physical injuries-such as suicidal ideations,
heavy drinking, deteriorating family relations, increased blood pres-
sure, and difficulty sleeping-that afflicted the plaintiffs in the pre-
ceding cases, and which in any event supported only far smaller
awards.
270
Therefore, finding that Carter "lack[ed] substantial, specific,
and corroborated evidence of the magnitude and duration of
[her] mental anguish," the district court concluded that the
jury must have been "forced to speculate in awarding
[her] compensatory damages"2 7' and reduced the award
to $15,000.272
These cases indicate that where the evidence of plaintiffs
emotional harm is limited to plaintiffs testimony, consisting
primarily of descriptions of personal feelings, and where there
are minimal manifestations of harm, such as crying, loss of
sleep and appetite, and family tensions, plaintiffs are likely to
have their emotional distress damage awards reduced to an
approximate sum of $15,000.
b. High-End "Garden-Variety" Distress Claims
The emotional distress claims and awards that fall into
the high-end "garden-variety" category tend to be claims sup-
ported by evidence very similar to the cases discussed above.
However, the plaintiffs distress is usually corroborated by
other witnesses and the physical manifestations of harm are
slightly more significant. This category can be defined by four
269 Id.
270 Id. (citing Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 688, 690 (2d Cir. 1988);
Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 673-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 110 F.3d
210 (2d Cir. 1997); McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 220 A.D.2d 668, 669,
632 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644 (2d Dep't 1995)).
271 Carter, 1998 WL 150491, at *23.
272 See id. at *25.
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cases, namely, McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co.,273 Kim v. Dial
Service International Inc.,74 Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc.,275
and Mahoney v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.27
In McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 77 an African-American
plaintiff prevailed on claims under Title VII, § 1981, and the
HRL, charging that his employer discriminated against him
based on his race when it failed to promote him and terminat-
ed him in retaliation for complaining about the alleged dis-
criminatory treatment. Plaintiff was awarded $219,428.00
by the jury for emotional distress.279 The only evidence pre-
sented at trial regarding McIntosh's emotional injury was his
testimony, which consisted of his "highly subjective" feel-
ings.280 Specifically, plaintiff testified he felt "humiliated"
during a meeting where he was "interrogated" by a supervisor
in an "accusatory manner" and that he felt "shocked" and "an-
gry" when he was reprimanded for reasons he believed were
unwarranted. Plaintiff also "felt like dirt," was "embar-
rassed," and "felt terrible" when he was required to have daily
meetings with his supervisor in front of his entire depart-
ment.2  McIntosh also complained of weakness in his legs,
stomach cramps, and chest pains.2 ' He stayed home from
work for a few days and felt mentally "beaten down."' Fi-
nally, plaintiff testified that he felt so ashamed that he avoid-
ed holidays with his family, felt inadequate because his
wife had to support him, and visited a doctor once while
still employed.2
After noting that McIntosh did not testify that his life
activities were curtailed in any way and that he did not pres-
ent evidence of psychological help, the court concluded that
887 F. Supp. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
"4 No. 96 Civ. 3327, 1997 WL 458783 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997).
"5 43 F. Supp. 2d 205 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
276 No. 94-CV-2924, 1998 WL 231082 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998).
887 F. Supp. 662, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
2' See id. at 663.
279 See id.
210 Id. at 664.
281 Id.






plaintiffs evidence of emotional injury was "sparse" and that
the jury had been forced to speculate in awarding damag-
es. 16 The court, characterizing plaintiffs testimony as
"conclusory,"287 and describing his physical manifestations of
harm as "short-lived," held that McIntosh's distress was simi-
lar to cases where compensatory damages were reduced sub-
stantially." Accordingly, the district court reduced the dam-
age award to $20,000.289
The proof of McIntosh's emotional harm differs only
slightly from the evidence supporting the low-end garden-vari-
ety claims, except that McIntosh visited a physician and suf-
fered from slightly more significant physical harm, such as
stomach cramps and chest pains.
In Kim v. Dial Service International, Inc., the plaintiff,
having proven he was unlawfully terminated because of his
age, race, and national origin under Title VII, the ADEA,
§ 1981, and the HRL, was awarded $300,000 for his emotional
distress, but the district court, finding that the award was not
supported by the evidence, reduced the award to $25,000.291
At trial, Kim testified that he felt "gloomy," had difficulty
sleeping, lost his appetite and twenty pounds, and began
drinking and taking sedatives.292 Kim's wife corroborated his
insomnia, drinking, and use of sedatives, and she added that
he did not like to socialize as a result of the discrimination. 3
Noting that an award of $300,000 for emotional distress would
be unprecedented and characterizing this evidence as "sparse,"
the Kim court relied on Binder, Miner and McIntosh to reduce
the award to $25,000.94 The district court also distinguished
Kim's circumstances from cases in which courts found "suffi-
cient substantiation" to uphold a $100,000 award, namely
circumstances where the plaintiff attempted suicide.2 95
288 Id. at 664-65.
28 McIntosh, 887 F. Supp. at 666.
28 Id. (citing Borja-Fierro v. Girozentrale Vienna Bank, No. 91 Civ. 8743, 1994
WL 240360, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1994)).
289 See id. at 669.
29 No. 96 Civ. 3327, 1997 WL 458783, at *12-*13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997).
291 See id. at *13.
292 Id. at *14.
23 See id.
29 See id. at *12-*14.
2' Kim, 1997 WL 458783, at *13-*14.
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In Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc.,296 two female plaintiffs,
Funk and Michetti, sued for sexual harassment and sex-based
constructive discharge under Title VII and the HRL.297 They
were awarded $850,000 and $450,000, respectively, by the jury
for their emotional distress."' The district court, however,
determined that the awards were excessive and reduced both
to $30,000.299
In support of her emotional distress claim, Michetti testi-
fied that the sexual harassment by her supervisor caused her
to "get sick about coming to work," that she was so scared and
shaken so badly that she almost urinated in her pants after
one incident, and that she felt "cheap, disrespected and con-
fused" after another incident."' Michetti also testified that
she felt that she had no control over her life, that she
cried, and that she was depressed." 1  Michetti experi-
enced headaches, loss of appetite, vomiting, diarrhea, and
stomach pains.0 2
Funk's testimony was similar. She testified that she had
experienced nightmares and flashbacks, that she was humiliat-
ed and degraded, and that she cried. 03 At trial, former co-
workers also testified to the women's reactions at work.0 4
The court noted that there was a paucity of evidence regarding
the magnitude, severity, and duration of the emotional anguish
suffered by the plaintiffs.0 ' Relying on McIntosh, Luciano,
Kim, Tanzini, and Binder, and distinguishing the plaintiffs'
harm from more egregious circumstances where treatment
was on-going, a physical condition was exacerbated, or there
were suicidal tendencies, the court reduced the awards to
$30,000 each.0 '
29 43 F. Supp. 2d 205 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
217 See id. at 212.
29 See id.
29 See id. at 227-28.
:"0 Id. at 223.




.25 See id. at 227.
" See Funk, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 228. Courts have also found awards of $30,000
appropriate in Tanzini v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A, 978 F. Supp. 70, 78
(.D.N.Y. 1997), and Hollis v. City of Buffalo, 28 F. Supp. 2d 812 (W.D.N.Y.
1998). In Tanzini, the court reduced an emotional distress award of $200,000 to
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Finally, on the high end of the "garden-variety" category
lies Mahoney v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.," ' in which a 38-
year old African-American salesman was awarded $35,000 for
his emotional distress after proving he was discriminated
against because of his age and race when he was denied a
promotion and retaliated against for complaining."'8  The
district court denied the defendant's remittitur motion and
upheld the award, rejecting the defendant's argument that
plaintiff did not provide an adequate basis for the award in
the record."9
At trial, Mahoney testified that, because he was trans-
ferred to an undesirable sales route, he "could not make a
living and support his family."31 Although "embarrassed,"
"extremely disappointed," "hurt," and worried about the future,
plaintiff only lost some sleep for approximately two or three
months.3 ' Plaintiffs testimony was corroborated to some
extent by a co-worker, who explained that plaintiff had "lost
his fire at work."312 Mahoney did not provide any medical tes-
timony or evidence. 13 The court held, however, that the evi-
$30,000 in an age discrimination action brought under the ADEA and the HRL.
See Tanzini, 978 F. Supp. at 70. The only evidence of harm presented at trial was
the testimony of plaintiff and his spouse. See id. at 78. Plaintiff testified that he
had been in a state of shock after his termination, that he did not leave the
house for one week, that he suffered memory loss, and that he suffered sleepless
nights. See id. Plaintiff also experienced nervousness and became short-tempered.
See id. His wife corroborated his testimony. See id. The court, finding that the
evidence of harm was similar to that of plaintiffs in McIntosh, Luciano, Binder,
and Borja-Fierro reduced the $200,000 award to $30,000. See Tanzini, 978 F.
Supp. at 80.
Similarly, in Hollis, the court awarded $30,000 for emotional distress to plain-
tiff after a bench trial in a Title VII and HRL sexual harassment case. See Hollis,
28 F. Supp. 2d at 827. Plaintiff had testified that she "felt exhausted," was a
nervous wreck, and experienced distress which resulted in hives, shortness of
breath and chest pains, and that her home life was affected. Id. Plaintiffs testimo-
ny was corroborated by several co-workers; however, she offered no medical testi-
mony or evidence. See id. at 826. After surveying a number of recent cases, in-
cluding Mahoney, the court determined $30,000 was an appropriate award. See id.
at 827.
3- No. 94-CV-2924, 1998 WL 231082 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998).
3u See id. at *1.
'" See id. at *5.
310 Id.
31 Id.
312 Mahoney, 1998 WL 231082, at *3.
313 See id. at *5.
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dence presented was sufficient to support the verdict and that
the $35,000 was reasonable.314 Notably, the evidence present-
ed in Mahoney differed from the evidence held insufficient to
support any award in Annis only with respect to plaintiff's
testimony that he lost sleep.315
A review of the evidence presented in support of the low-
end and high-end garden-variety claims indicates that there is
very little difference between these categories. The cases yield-
ing slightly higher awards, however, appear to be more recent
cases that contain some, although not particularly strong, cor-
roborating testimony by at least one other witness, usually the
plaintiff's spouse or a co-worker. None of the claims in either
category were supported by medical evidence or testimony.
One may also reconcile the differences between these cate-
gories by acknowledging the effect of inflation on a jury's per-
ception of what is reasonable; while damage awards of $5,000
to $15,000 may have been appropriate a few years ago, such
nominal awards may not be reasonable today.16 Notably,
since Binder, not one federal court has remitted a damage
award to a sum of $5,000 for emotional distress, and at least
one court has noted that where emotional distress is supported
by evidence similar to that in Binder, $35,000 appears now to
mark the "low end" of the continuum.317 Where plaintiff testi-
fies to his or her emotional harm and where that testimony
describes common symptoms of distress associated with any
adverse employment decision, where the physical manifesta-
tions of such harm are transient, and where there is some
corroboration, even absent medical proof or expert testimony,
plaintiffs are likely to recover somewhere between $15,000 to
$35,000 if an employer makes a post-trial motion.
c. Significant Emotional Distress Claims
The emotional distress claims for which courts have
awarded significant damage awards ranging from $50,000 to
3, See id. at *6-*7.
315 See id.
" See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 110
F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).




approximately $85,000 do not differ greatly from the garden-
variety distress claims with respect to the evidence of harm
presented. Distress claims in this category, however, do appear
to differ from garden-variety claims in two ways: either with
respect to the nature of the underlying discriminatory conduct
or with respect to how the evidence of harm is presented at
trial. With respect to the nature of the discriminatory action,
garden-variety distress claims appear to be based upon an
employer's one-time decision that adversely affects a particular
employee, such as a decision to terminate or not to promote the
employee. In contrast, where emotional distress claims are
predicated on an employer having subjected plaintiff to numer-
ous episodes of harassment, constituting a pattern of discrimi-
nation over a period of time, such distress appears to warrant
a more substantial award. The cases in this category include,
Trivedi v. Cooper,318 Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Au-
thority,319 and Perdue v. City University of New York."'
In Trivedi v. Cooper,2' the district court remitted a
$700,000 compensatory damage award to $50,000 in favor of
an East Asian Indian plaintiff who filed claims under §§ 1981
and 1983 and the HRL for harassment and failure to promote
on the basis of his race, national origin, and for retaliation.322
Despite the fact that the district court found that the plaintiff
had introduced "scant" evidence on the issue of emotional dis-
tress, that he had failed to present evidence of psychological
counseling, or physical manifestations of distress, the court
awarded plaintiff $50,000."2 Trivedi asserted that his super-
visor assigned him to menial tasks in the research lab where
he worked, prevented him from collaborating with other re-
searchers, did not give him work that would lead to publica-
tion, prevented him from attending professional seminars and
conferences, and barred him from using the computer and the
library.32 The court determined that the evidence presented
at trial demonstrated that the work Trivedi was given was un-
318 No. 95 Civ. 2075, 1996 WL 724743 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996).
319 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
320 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
321 No. 95 Civ. 2075, 1996 WL 724743 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1996).
32 See id. at *1.
32 Id. at *9.
324 See id. at *5.
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likely to lead to career advancement." 5 Trivedi testified that
he had felt "starved of professional growth" and that he felt
"insulted," "indignant," "unhappy," and "emotionally upset.""2 '
While the court determined that plaintiffs statements were
"patently insufficient" to uphold a $700,000 award, the court
focused on Trivedi's evidence that established that for many
years, his supervisor had used racial slurs in speaking to him,
including ridiculing him as a "brown nigger."327 The court
concluded that under these circumstances an award of $50,000
was "generous." "'
In a recent case of first impression, Leibovitz v. New York
City Transit Authority,329 a female employee was permitted to
recover damages for emotional distress for having been subject-
ed to a hostile work environment under Title VII and the HRL,
although she herself was not a target of sexual harassment,
and was awarded $60,000."' 0 Leibovitz claimed that she suf-
fered emotional distress from a hostile environment in which
other women were harassed."' Specifically, Leibovitz, a
Deputy Superintendent for the Transit Authority, had been
assigned to a car inspection and cleaning shop where she
learned that a number of female car cleaners had accused a
male supervisor of sexual harassment.332 She spoke with a
number of members of upper management about the charges,
but there was a delay in the Authority's investigation of
plaintiffs allegations.3 3 Finding that Leibovitz had standing
to bring a hostile work environment claim,3 4 the court con-
cluded that she had presented sufficient evidence of wide-
spread gender-based harassment about which the Authority
was indifferent, passive and acted in an unconcerned man-
ner.335 The jury awarded plaintiff $60,000 for her emotional
3' See id. at *1.
326 Trivedi, 1996 WL 724743, at *9.
327 Id. at *2.
' Id. at *9.
's 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
'o See id. at 146.
'i See id.
See id.
See id. at 147.
See Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
See id. at 151-53.
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distress."3 6 After trial, the district court rejected the
defendant's motion for remittitur.337 Relying on plaintiffs tes-
timony that she had been depressed, unable to sleep, gained
weight, and suffered anxiety and other symptoms of depres-
sion, and her psychiatrist's corroborating testimony, the court
upheld the $60,000 award.338
Similarly, in Perdue v. City University of New York,339 a
female basketball coach was awarded $85,000 for emotional
distress under Title VII for her gender discrimination and
hostile work environment claims.34 The district court upheld
the award.34 Perdue provided extensive evidence of the dis-
parate treatment she endured for years because of her gen-
der.342 Although no one demanded that she "do the laundry,"
during the last two years of her employment she "was washing
uniforms with the manager from the men's team."343 Her of-
fice was the equivalent of a broom closet; whereas, the men's
coach had two offices.3" She also had a more limited budget
for housing, dining, recruiting, equipment, athletic undergar-
ments and uniforms.345 Unlike the men's coach, she had to
clean the gym for her games.34 She also had inferior practice
times, fewer assistants, and no team locker room.' Perdue
had also been subjected to sexual slurs and improprieties, such
as commentary about the size of her breasts.348 As a result,
Perdue felt disgraced, embarrased, scared, concerned for her
future, belittled, and disrespected.349 Perdue also presented
evidence that the significant stress she experienced aggravated
her pre-existing back injury, requiring her to visit a chiroprac-
tor and physician, who prescribed pain medication.350 Based
See id. at 153.
See id.
See id.
3' 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
340 See id. at 331.
341 See id. at 337.
3 2 See id. at 333-34, 337.
3,0 Id. at 336.





31' See Perdue, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
" See id.
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on this evidence, the court determined that the jury's $85,000
award for her emotional distress was not excessive. 5'
This range of damage awards has also been typically up-
held where plaintiff is not the sole witness, presents corrobo-
rating testimony (usually with a psychologist, psychiatrist or
medical healthcare professional), and testifies that he or she
took medication for his or her condition. One such case is
Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc. 52 In Weissman, the
district court remitted the jury's $95,000 emotional distress
award to $65,000 because it was excessive in light of the evi-
dence presented at trial.353 While the court did not describe
plaintiffs testimony in detail, it justified the $65,000 award by
highlighting that, at trial, the plaintiff had called the psycholo-
gist who had treated him weekly for a year as a witness, who
confirmed plaintiffs statements of depression, isolation, and
problems in his marriage.5 4 The psychiatrist also confirmed
that although the plaintiff had improved, he was not cured at
the time he discontinued his treatment.3"5 Distinguishing this
evidence from the evidence presented in the "'garden-variety
mental-anguish claims,'"35 6 but finding that the plaintiffs
mental anguish was far less serious than in cases where plain-
tiffs had testified about attempted suicides, had taken anti-
depressant medication, or had years of treatment, the district
court reduced the damages to $65,000. 357
d. Substantial Emotional Distress Claims
Courts have awarded damages for emotional distress in
the sum of $100,000 only in cases where the employer's dis-
criminatory conduct has caused plaintiff stress which manifest-
ed itself in the form of severe emotional or physical reactions.
351 See id.
352 No. 95 Civ. 1841, 1999 WL 144488 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1999).
"' See id. at *2.
"u See id. at *1.
See id.
' Id. (citation omitted).
... See Weissman, 1999 VIL 144488, at *2.
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Examples of leading cases in this category are Marfia v.
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, New York Branch35 and Bick v. City of
New York.359
In Marfia, the Second Circuit upheld a $100,000 pain and
suffering award for a bank employee who, because of his Ital-
ian national origin, was fired from his job in the New York
branch of a Turkish bank.36 Although the district court's
opinion contains limited information regarding the evidence of
Marfia's pain and suffering, Marfia presented testimony that
he had tried to kill himself by pointing a loaded gun to his
head and was stopped only by his 15-year-old son.361
Plaintiff thereafter spent two weeks in a hospital on
"suicide watch."62
In Bick, a female sergeant sued the New York Police De-
partment for harassment, gender discrimination and retalia-
tion under Title VII and the HRL.363 Her claims arose out of
her having filed and prosecuted a number of misconduct charg-
es against the Department, which were based in part on com-
plaints of harassment by another female police officer.3 The
jury awarded Bick $750,000 for pain and suffering, but the
district court determined that the award was excessive and
reduced it to $100,000.365 At trial, Bick testified that she felt
"devastated" and that she sought counseling from the unit that
provides counseling services for officers. 366 Bick had also been
"unable to overcome her sense of despair" and continued to
seek help from the police department counselor for an entire
year, until she sought treatment from a trained social work-
er.167 At the time of trial, Bick had had forty-five counseling
sessions and was still in treatment. 6 ' She had also sought
treatment from a psychiatrist who had prescribed anti-depres-
8 903 F. Supp. 463, 465-67, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 100
F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1996).
'5' No. 95 Civ. 8781, 1998 WL 190283 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998).
'" See Marfia, 903 F. Supp. at 471.
361 See id. at 467.
362 Id.
" See Bick, 1998 WL 190283, at *1.
'" See id.
See id. at *27.
6 Id. at *23.
367 id.
3" See Bick, 1998 WL 190283, at *23.
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sant medication.69 The plaintiff's social worker corroborated
Bick's distress, describing her as suffering from anxiety, de-
pression and feelings of powerlessness, and that she had been
humiliated, experienced disrupted sleep and weight gain, and
suffered from "suicidal ideation."370 She further testified that
while Bick had made progress and was less depressed, she still
needed treatment."' After comparing the evidence of Bick's
emotional distress to evidence presented in other cases, the
court reduced the damages award from $750,000 to $100,000,
distinguishing Bick from the garden-variety claims and from
cases where the awards exceeded $100,000.372
e. Egregious Emotional Distress Claims
Finally, the high end of the continuum is defined by deci-
sions in which federal district courts have remitted damages to
a final award in excess of $100,000. Two of the cases frequent-
ly cited by courts which apparently establish this end of the
spectrum are Shea v. Icelandiar.3 and Ramirez v. New York
City Off-Track Betting Corp.3"
369 See id.
0 Id. at *24.
371 See id.
372 See id. at *25-*27.
'n 925 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
3' No. 93 Civ. 0682, 1996 WL 210001 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1996), affd in part,
vacated in part, 112 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Quinn v. Nassau County
Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (ruling that a $250,000 emotional
distress award was not excessive for former police officers' § 1983 hostile work
environment claim for pervasive, shocking harassment based on his homosexuality
which lasted a number of years); Town of Hempstead v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 233 A.D.2d 451, 649 N.Y.S.2d 942 (2d Dep't 1996) (upholding a $500,000
award where the plaintiff, who had been the victim of childhood sexual abuse, was
subjected to sexual harassment which caused her severe continuing emotional
distress, including a fear of going out alone); Tiffany & Co. v. Smith, 224 A.D.2d
332, 638 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st Dep't 1996) (upholding a $300,000 award where plain-
tiff continued to suffer severe depression, anorexia, and insomnia); New York City
Transit Auth. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 181 A.D.2d 891, 581 N.Y.S.2d 426
(2d Dep't 1992) (upholding award of $450,000; plaintiff who had previously suf-
fered miscarriage and other pregnancy problems had been discriminated against on
four separate occasions over a year, including employer's refusal to restrict duties
in accordance with physician's directions, plaintiff suffered anguish, guilt, depres-
sion, and anger, and mental distress continued until time of trial and would con-
tinue the rest of her life; considered a "shocking" instance of discrimination).
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In Shea, an employee who was demoted based on his age
in violation of the ADEA and the HRL received an award of
$175,000 for his emotional distress,3 75 which the court remit-
ted from a $250,000 jury award.376 Shea had been an employ-
ee of Icelandair since 1956 and was demoted and then termi-
nated at the age of 63. He claimed that he had been the
target of a campaign to force his retirement which consisted of
repeated, unwarranted complaints from his supervisors that
his work performance had been unsatisfactory and that he had
mishandled cargo transactions.378 Plaintiff was also routinely
excluded from department meetings.379 In reviewing the evi-
dence to determine an appropriate award, the district court
noted that the most important factor which set this case apart
from others involving emotional distress is the fact that
Icelandair's discriminatory conduct had had physical conse-
quences.380 Six months after Shea was demoted, he was diag-
nosed with Parkinson's Disease, and at the time of trial Shea
was experiencing a number of debilitating symptoms including
muscle spasms, insomnia, slurred speech, rigidity, tremors,
and loss of balance.38' Shea testified that the disease was
worsening, that he had balance problems and fell around the
house, and that he had to be careful when walking.8 2 Shea
also testified that he felt upset and sick, experienced sleep
problems, and was unable to hold down his food.383
Shea also testified that these symptoms had significantly
altered his lifestyle.3 Once an active sportsman, he could no
longer participate in leisure activities such as biking, golfing,
and gardening, and could no longer perform a variety of tasks
'75 See Shea, 925 F. Supp. at 1019.
"7 See id. at 1029.
3" See id. at 1018.
"7 See id. at 1019.
... See id.
... See Shea, 925 F. Supp. at 1022.
381 See id.
382 See id.
"8 See id. at 1024.
'"See id.
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around the house.3" The discrimination also had a devastat-
ing effect on him emotionally and he claimed that he "dreaded
the future."386
Plaintiffs harm was corroborated by two expert medical
witnesses.31 The first expert testified at length that there
was a relationship between stress and the aggravation of
Parkinson's Disease.3' The expert further concluded that the
stress Shea suffered was caused by the demotion and termina-
tion and had caused the onset of the disease.389 The second
expert, Shea's cardiologist, testified that Shea had suffered
cardiac symptoms as the result of the defendant's conduct and
that the recent onset of chest pain was exacerbated by stress
at work.390
Plaintiff sought medical treatment from a doctor for head-
aches, stomach aches, and depression and presented the
doctor's notes at trial.391 Plaintiff also was prescribed medi-
cation for his continued depression.39 However, plaintiff did
not obtain psychological treatment.393 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs personal and professional lives were affected
by the demotion. 94 Although the plaintiff told his wife of the
demotion, he did not reveal it to his children until a year later
or to other family members until three years later.395 He
stopped attending most family gatherings, and his relation-
ship with his wife suffered as plaintiff became short-tempered
and angry in the period following his demotion.96 The
court determined that there was "compelling evidence" of
emotional distress.
397
Furthermore, in comparing the evidence supporting Shea's
emotional distress with evidence supporting other awards, the
" See Shea, 925 F. Supp. at 1022.
35 Id.
3" See id. at 1022-23.
's See id.
See id.




31 See id. at 1024.
31 See Shea, 925 F. Supp. at 1024-25.
3" See id.
31 Id. at 1024.
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court found that Shea had presented a much more compelling
set of facts than those garden-variety emotional distress claims
because of the magnitude of physical manifestations of
plaintiff's distress.398 The humiliation, shame, and fear that
Shea experienced after he was demoted continued until the
date of the trial more than five years later. 9 After examin-
ing those cases in which "the conduct resulted in significant
emotional pain and suffering" the court determined that limit-
ed remittitur was warranted and reduced the $250,000 award
to $175,000.400
In Ramirez, the court determined that the plaintiff was en-
titled to an award for emotional distress in excess of $100,000
where he had presented similar evidence of egregious emotion-
al distress.41' Ramirez sued his employer, the New York City
Off-Track Betting Corporation ("OTB") for employment dis-
crimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and
§ 1983.402 The jury found in plaintiffs favor and awarded him
$2.58 million.43 The OTB moved for a new trial and remit-
titur.4 4 The district court upheld the verdict but reduced the
award to $1,934,375.405 Specifically, the emotional distress
damage award was remitted from $1,145,625 to $500,000.408
In evaluating Ramirez's damages for emotional distress,
the court noted that he had had a pre-existing psychiatric
condition that had not adversely affected his ability to work at
his job prior to his dismissal4 7 and that his employment
"tethered him to a stable existence."404 At trial, the
"[d]ramatic" emotional distress suffered by Ramirez was estab-
lished by Ramirez's testimony and the testimony of his psychi-
atrist and girlfriend.40 9 Ramirez's psychiatrist testified that
"' See id. at 1025.
3" See id. at 1027.
"' Shea, 925 F. Supp. at 1029.
401 See Ramirez v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., No. 93 Civ. 0682,
1996 WL 210001 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1996), affd in part, vacated in part, 112 F.3d
38 (2d Cir. 1997).
"' See id. at *1.
o See id.
4o See id.
"' See id. at *5.
4" See Ramirez, 1996 WL 210001, at *5-*7.
'o, See id. at *8 n.3.
411 Id. at *7.
'" Id. at *6.
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after his dismissal Ramirez was "unable to function," "was not
in good shape when he left [the doctor's care], that he "never
got better," and that his condition was static.41° Plaintiff also
testified that his emotional distress was on-going.41'
Ramirez's girlfriend testified that when he was released from
the hospital after being fired, he was incoherent, hurt, and lost
his self-esteem.412 She also testified that he slept a lot, that
he occasionally stayed up all night, that he did not wash, and
that the incident "took his whole self away from him."'13
In determining appropriate damages, the district court
noted that: "The job provided him not only with the ability to
obtain the monetary means and health benefits necessary to
seek treatment, but also, on a more abstract level, it gave him
the link with mainstream society that kept him a stable and
productive person."414 The district court further held that
when that tie was severed, Ramirez lost both his ability and
incentive to stay on an even keel, that the psychological dam-
age Ramirez suffered was so substantial that it rendered him
unemployable, and that his inability to function in society
would persist indefinitely into the future.415 Characterizing
this evidence of emotional distress as "[diramatic" and "sub-
stantial," the court determined that the maximum damages
that could have been awarded without shocking the conscience
was $500,000.416 The court did note, however, that an award
of this amount would not be appropriate for emotional damag-
es caused by improper termination except under the most un-
usual circumstances.417
Federal courts routinely distinguish emotional distress
claims before them from the distress suffered by Shea and
Ramirez. As a result, plaintiffs appear to be awarded damages
for emotional distress in excess of $100,000 on rare occasion;
410 Id.
411 See Ramirez, 1996 WL 210001, at *8 n.3 (Plaintiff testified, inter alia, that
he "[had not] really recovered completely.").
412 See id. at *8 n.11.
413 Id.
," Id. at *7.
413 See id. at *6-*7.
-' See Ramirez, 1996 WL 210001, at *6-*7.
417 See id. Apparently, the Ramirez decision has defined $500,000 as the high
end of the damages spectrum for emotional distress damage awards in employ-
ment cases in this circuit.
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therefore, future plaintiffs seeking similar awards should be
mindful of different values courts assign to degrees of emotion-
al distress. Similarly, while litigation may cost an employer a
tremendous amount of money, employers should be aware that
absent egregious harm such as suicide attempts, plaintiff's
inability to function in society, or causation or aggravation of a
serious and degenerative disease, the value of a plaintiffs
emotional distress is likely to be fixed at less than $100,000,
and if it is a garden-variety distress claim, that is, transient
harm unsupported by medical proof or expert testimony, such
a claim may not be worth more than $15,000-$30,000.
CONCLUSION
It is not difficult for a discrimination plaintiff to survive
summary judgment and thus reach the jury with respect to a
claim for emotional distress. Once the plaintiff has reached the
jury, it is also not difficult for the plaintiff to obtain a favorable
verdict by presenting only slight or scant evidence of emotional
distress. Discrimination plaintiffs, who institute and continue
to litigate discrimination actions expecting very substantial
emotional distress awards should, however, be advised that
these expectations are unrealistic. Emotional distress awards
are not unpredictable; rather, federal courts in the Second
Circuit rely on precedent to determine what are appropriate
monetary awards in the context of remittitur. These cases
provide litigants and courts with one possible tool to evaluate
emotional distress claims in their own cases. This spectrum is
but one way to analyze the various range of damages awarded
by federal courts in recent years for emotional distress claims
in discrimination suits. There will, of course, be other perspec-
tives as to how these cases should be analyzed or categorized
to justify the damages awarded by courts. In any event, this
spectrum presents litigants and courts engaging in settlement
conferences with the opportunity to gauge the strength of a
particular claim so that a range of damages can be identified
as a starting point for negotiations. If, in the early stages of
litigation, parties understand how remittitur operates and
appreciate how a federal district court in this circuit is likely
to evaluate the claims, parties may be inclined to achieve a
more expedient settlement of these cases.
[Vol. 65: 2





BASED ON Back and Compensatory Punitive or Does Statutory
Front Pay* (including Liquidated Cap Apply?
emotional distress)
Title VII race, color, religion,
sex, and national Yes Yes** Punitives* Yes
origin
ADEA age (over 40 years Liquidated (2x
old) Yes No back pay No
I _award)
ADA mental or physical
disability Yes Yes* Punitives** Yes
§ 1981 race, ethnicity, and
ancestry in private- Yes Yes Punitives No
sector employment
§ 1983 race, gender, and
religion where
defendant acts under




NY HRL age, race, creed, color,
national origin, sex,
disability, genetic pre- Yes Yes No No
disposition, or marital
status
A number of circuits and New York courts are split over whether front pay is legal or
equitable relief and therefore subject to a mandatory statutory cap. See supra note 99.




A. Low-End "Garden-Variety" Emotional Distress Claims ($5,000-$15,000):
Case Statutory Basis Plaintiff sole Medical Expert? Evidence of Damages Awarded
and Claim witness? Evidence Effects bf Adverse
(others?) Action on Plaintiff
Binder ADEA and Yes No No Felt inadequate and $5,000
HRL (age) isolated. (remitted from
$498,000)
Luciano § 1983 No No No Felt hurt, shocked, $11,400
(religion) (wife) upset, sad, and (upheld jury award)
worried; cried; lost
sleep and appetite.
Miner § 1983 No No No Felt inadequate and $12,500
(religion and (wife) embarrassed; (upheld district court
due process considered suicide; award)
deprivation) experienced family
tension.
Cowan Title VII and No No No Felt humiliated; lost $15,000 (upheld
§ 1981 (wife and co- self-esteem; award after bench
(race) workers) experienced family trial)
problems; began
drinking heavily.
Borja- Title VII and Yes No No No discussion of $15,000
Fierro HRL evidence; reference (remitted from
(race, national to one visit with $180,000)
origin, and psychologist.
retaliation)
Carter Title VII No No Yes Felt "very upset," $15,000
(hostile work (social worker (physi- sad and anxious, was (remitted from
environment) and expert) clan) "a mess"; cried; $175,000)
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TABLE 2-Continued
B. High-End "Garden Variety" Distress Claims ($20,000.$35,000):*
Case Statutory Basis Plaintiff sole Medical Expert? Evidence of Damages Awarded
and Claim witness? Evidence Effects of Adverse
(others?) Action on Plaintiff
Mclntosh Title VII, Yes No No "Sparse evidence"; $20,000 (remitted
§ 198 1. and felt humiliated, angry, from $219,000)
HRL (race and and embarrassed;
failure to weak legs; stomach





Kim Title VII, No No No "Sparse evidence"; $25,000 (remitted
ADEA, § 1981, (wife) felt gloomy, lost from $300,000)
and HRL (race, sleep, began drinking,
religion, and took sedatives,
national origin) avoided socializing,
and gained weight.
Funk Tide VII and No No No A. Michetti:
(two HRL (sex (co-workers) Felt sick about $30,000 (remitted
plaintiffs) harassment and coming to work, was from $850,000 and
hostile work scared, shook badly; $450,000)
environment) felt cheap and
disrespected; suffered
from lack of control
over her life,
depression, head-








Mahoney Title VII and No No No Felt embarrassed, $35.000
ADFA (age, (co-worker) extremely (jury award upheld)
race, and disappointed. hurt.
retaliation) and worried; lost
sleep for 2-3 months.
* For additional cases in this range, see supra note 306.
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C. Significant Emotional Distress Claims ($50,000-$85,000):
Cases Statutory Plaintiff sole Medical Expert? Evidence of Damages Awarded
Basis and witness? Evidence Effects of Adverse
Claim (others?) Action on Plaintiff
Trivedi §§ 1981 and Yes No No "Scant evidence"; $50,000 (remitted
1983 no physical from $700,000)
(harassment manifestations of
and denial of distress; felt
promotion "starved" for
based on race, professional growth,
national insulted, unhappy,
origin, and and upset; subjected




Leibovirz Title VII and No No Yes Felt depressed, lost $60,000
HRL (expert) (psychiatrist) sleep, gained (jury award upheld)





Weissman Basis not No No Yes Felt depressed and $65,000 (remitted




Perdue Title VII Yes Yes No Felt disgraced, $85.000 (jury award
(gender and (evidence embarrassed, upheld)
hostile work that stress scared, worried
environment) aggravat- about future, and
ed pre- belittled; visited
existing chiropractor and
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D. Substantial Emotional Distress Claims ($100,000):
Cases Statutory Basis Plaintiffsole Medical Expert? Effects of Adverse Damages Awarded
and Claim witness? Evidence Action
(others?)
Mafta Title VII Yes No No Limited evidence in $100,000 (upheld




Bick Title VII and No No No Felt devastated; $100,000 (remitted
HRL (social worker) sought counseling; from $750,000)
(harassment, unable to overcome
gender despair took anti-
discrimination, depressants, lost




at time of trial.
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E. Egregious Emotional Distress Claims (over $100,000):*
[Vol. 65: 2
Cases Statutory Basis Plaintiff sole Medical Expert? Effects of Adverse Damages Awarded
and Claim witness? Evidence Action
(others?)
Shea ADEA and No Yes Yes Diagnosed with $175,000 (remitted
HRL (age: (experts) (cardi- Parkinson's disease; from $250,000)
forced ologist experienced muscle
retirement and and spasms, insomnia,
discharge) doctor) slurred speech.
















for more than 5
years.
Ramirez Title VII and § No Yes Yes "Dramatic" $500,000 (remitted
1983 (girlfriend and (psych- evidence; discharge from $1,145,625)










sleep; lost ability to
obtain health
benefits.
* See also supra note 374.
